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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over Sierra Club's petition for review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(b). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue 1: Whether the Utah Air Quality Board (the "Board") correctly held that the 
Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ") was not legally required to consider carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases in its best available control technology ("BACT") 
analysis for the Sevier Power Company ("SPC") facility? 
Standard of Review: Judicial review of a final decision of the Board is governed 
by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"). The Court may grant relief 
only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the 
following: 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law, 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4) (emphasis added). 
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Sierra Club claims that the Board erroneously interpreted or applied the Federal 
Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act, and/or their implementing regulations. 
The Utah Legislature has granted to the Board powers to make regulations "regarding the 
control, abatement, and prevention of air pollution from all sources and the establishment 
of the maximum quantity of air contaminants that may be emitted by any air contaminant 
source." Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104(l)(a). In addition, the Board may "issue orders 
necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-104(3)(b). 
As the agency charged with administering Utah's air permitting program, the Board's 
interpretation of the applicable regulations is entitled to deference, and is not to be 
disturbed unless it "exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." King v. Indus. 
Comm n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("[Consideration of an 
agency's expertise and experience is relevant in determining whether the agency should 
make the necessary policy choice and thus be granted deference by the reviewing 
court."); Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, f 9 148 P.3d 960 (stating that 
as to agency's "'interpretation of the operative provisions of statutory law it is 
empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be rationally based and are set aside 
only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of 
reason'" {quoting Associated Gen. Contractors v. Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 
112, f 18, 38 P.3d 291)); Allen v. Dep 't of Workforce Servs., 2005 UT App 186, ^  5, 112 
P.3d 1238 ("We recognize that the federal courts afford federal agencies greater 
discretion to interpret federal law.. . . [W]e see no reason that the same standards that 
SaltLake-399687 4 0076000-07002 -2-
apply to state agency interpretations of state law should not apply here also." (citing 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984))). 
Deference to an agency's interpretation is especially important where, as here, the 
applicable regulations concern a technical area of law. Sorge v. Attorney Gen., 2006 UT 
App 2, Tf 17, 128 P.3d 566 (stating deference should be extended to agency because it, 
"by virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better position than [we are] to give effect 
to the regulatory objective to be achieved"). 
Statement of Grounds to Deny Review of Unpreserved Issue. Sierra Club 
argues that the Board erred in not applying the correct BACT regulation when it affirmed 
DAQ's determination that it was not legally required to consider carbon dioxide in its 
BACT analysis. Specifically, Sierra Club contends that the Board should have applied 
the subsequently revised BACT regulation rather than the original BACT regulation that 
was in effect at the time DAQ determined it was not legally required to consider carbon 
dioxide. (Pet'rBr. 19.) 
Sierra Club did not raise this issue before the agency. Thus, because the Court's 
adjudication of this matter is under the UAPA (which limits the issues to those actually 
raised before the agency, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)), and under well-established 
case law on the preservation of issues for appeals generally, Sierra Club's argument is 
untimely. E.g., Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, f 14, 48 P.3d 968 
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("[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the trial court 
in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.").1 
In fact, Sierra Club argues that the Board erred by reviewing the very version of 
the regulation Sierra Club asked it to review. On October 12, 2004, DAQ issued its 
Approval Order ("AO") on the premise that the BACT analysis had been performed in 
conformance with the then existing BACT regulation—R3 07-101-2 (the "Original BACT 
Regulation"). In its November 12, 2004 Request for Agency Action, Sierra Club asked 
the Board to review whether, under the Original BACT Regulation, DAQ should have 
considered carbon dioxide. (Request for Agency Action at 4.) In 2006, the Board 
revised and renumbered the regulation for clarification and ease of use (the "Revised 
BACT Regulation"). Notwithstanding, in its February 16, 2007 Amended Request for 
Agency Action, Sierra Club again asserted that the Original BACT Regulation was 
applicable, and asked the Board to review whether DAQ should have considered carbon 
Recognizing its failure to preserve this issue, Sierra Club asserts that "[t]o the 
extent that an issue was not preserved below, it is subject to plain error analysis," and in 
support thereof cites D.B. v. Division of Occupational Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 
1145, 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). (Pet'r Br. 2.) However, that case reaffirms that "[a]s a 
general rule, objections or questions which have not been raised or urged in the 
proceedings before the administrative agency will not be considered by the court on 
review of the order of such agency," and simply recognizes that a reviewing court is "not 
precluded" from taking notice of a "plain error." 779 P.2d at 1148. In the alternative, 
Sierra Club cite the unpublished case of Glazier's Foodtown v. Department of Workforce 
Services, No. 981075-CA, 1998 WL 1758307, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 27, 1998) for 
the proposition that "an unpreserved objection may be reached upon a showing of 
substantial prejudice." (Pet'r Br. 2.) Yet that case does not reference any "substantial 
prejudice" standard, but simply references the D.B. case, and repeats the same holding 
that a reviewing court is not precluded from taking notice of a "plain error affecting the 
substantial rights of a party." 1998 WL 1758307 at *1. Nothing in this case comes close 
to constituting "plain error." 
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dioxide under that Regulation. (Amended Request for Agency Action at 3.) Sierra Club 
cannot now argue that the Board erred in doing exactly what Sierra Club asked it to do, 
Issue 2: Whether the Board correctly held that DAQ was not required to include 
integrated gasification combined cycle ("IGCC") technology in its BACT analysis? 
Standard of Review. The issue of whether DAQ was required to include IGCC 
in its BACT analysis involves questions of law (whether a power generation technology 
such as IGCC constitutes an emission control technology per the regulation, whether the 
BACT regulation should be interpreted to "redefine" the design of the source, etc.), 
questions of fact (whether IGCC is an "available" technology, whether IGCC has been 
successfully demonstrated in practice, etc.), and mixed questions of law and fact. 
Question of Fact: The applicable standard is "substantial evidence." An 
agency's factual findings must be upheld if they are supported by "substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4); Sierra 
Club, 2006 UT 74, \ 9. 
Question of Law: The applicable standard is set forth above under Issue 1. 
Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: A mixed question of fact and law is 
defined as "the application of law to fact." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus/Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2007 UT 42, \ 27 n.4, 164 P.3d 384. If the Court 
concludes that certain questions are mixed, such questions are also reviewed under an 
intermediate or deferential standard, rather than for mere correctness. Id. at f^ 28 (stating 
that "a mixed question of fact and law requires] some deference"); Sorge, 2006 UT App 
2, f 17 ("In the case at hand, the agency decision involved 'mixed questions of law and 
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fact.' Because this is the type of decision 'in which the agency's special expertise puts it 
in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the circumstances of the case in 
light of the agency mission,' we apply a deferential standard of review to the [agency's] 
decision."); Drake v. Indus. Comm 9n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) (stating that 
"agency's application of the law to the facts may" be reviewed with "varying degrees of 
strictness" (quotation omitted). 
This deferential standard for mixed questions achieves "reasonableness and 
rationality." Ameritemps, Inc. v. Labor Comm 'n, 2005 UT App 491, f 8, 128 P.3d 31 
("'[W]hen an agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the law, we will not 
disturb the agency's application unless its determination exceeds the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality.'" (quotation omitted)); Allen, UT App 186, \ 6 ("Agency 
decisions that apply the law to facts are entitled to discretion and 'are [only] subject to 
judicial review to assure they fall within the limits of reasonableness and rationality.'" 
(quotation omitted)); see also Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^ f 9 (in reviewing questions of 
"'mixed findings of fact and law, and [the agency's] interpretation of the operative 
provisions of statutory law it is empowered to administer, [agency] findings must be 
rationally based and are set aside only if they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or 
are beyond the tolerable limits of reason.'" (quotation omitted)). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL AUTHORITY 
The following legal authority are attached as Addenda A through E: 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990) (federal statutory definition of BACT). 
B. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (federal regulatory definition of BACT). 
SaltLake-399687 4 0076000-07002 
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C. Former Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101 -2 (2005) (Original BACT Regulation) 
(same from 98-06). 
D. Utah Admin. Code r. 307-401-2 (2006) (Revised BACT Regulation). 
E. Utah Air Quality Board's 1/9/08 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Order ("Final Order"). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of the Case: On September 10, 2003, SPC submitted an application to 
DAQ to construct a coal-fired electric generating facility. On October 12, 2004, after 
extensive environmental review, DAQ issued an AO for the proposed facility. 
Course of Proceedings: On November 12, 2004, Sierra Club filed a Request for 
Agency Action, asking the Board to review DAQ's issuance of the AO, and raising 
several issues. Because of their importance to PacifiCorp and the electric utility industry, 
PacifiCorp sought permission, and was allowed to intervene on two of those issues 
(carbon dioxide and IGCC). On February 26, 2007, respondents, including PacifiCorp, 
filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, asking the Board to dismiss Sierra Club's 
claims, including its carbon dioxide and IGCC claims, as a matter of law. On April 4, 
2007, the Board heard extensive argument from all of the parties. 
Disposition Below: On May 2, 2007, the Board issued its Order granting (by a 
vote of seven to zero) respondents' motions to dismiss as to the carbon dioxide issue. 
However, the Board denied respondents' motions as to the IGCC issue "on the basis that 
there were contested issues of fact that would require an evidentiary hearing and not just 
questions of law." At hearings on October 1 and 3, and November 7 and 12, 2007, the 
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Board received extensive evidence and testimony relating to the remaining issues, 
including IGCC. On November 12, 2007, the Board affirmed DAQ's issuance of the AO 
(by a vote of six to one). On January 9, 2008, the Board issued its Final Order. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Utah law requires potential sources of air pollution to obtain a permit before 
commencing construction. Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-108. DAQ administers this 
permitting program through regulations promulgated by the Board. The permit 
requirements depend on whether the source area is in "attainment" or "nonattainment" 
with applicable National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS"), and on the 
potential emission rates. See Utah Admin. Code r. 307-403, -405, -415. The proposed 
SPC facility is to be located in an "attainment area" for all regulated pollutants. 
The federal Clean Air Act (the "Clean Air Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq., 
requires states to adopt regulatory programs for issuing a specific type of construction 
permit to any major air pollution source located in an attainment area. This permit is 
known as a "Prevention of Significant Deterioration" or "PSD" permit. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7470 (2006). Utah has adopted a regulatory program for PSD permits, which the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has approved as part of Utah's State 
Implementation Plan ("SIP"). 40 C.F.R. § 52.2320. 
PSD permits require a number of demonstrations and conditions. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7475(a)(3) (2006). The PSD permit requirement relevant to this case is a proposed 
facility's obligation to utilize BACT for each pollutant subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act. BACT is defined as follows: 
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[A]n emission limitation and/or other controls to include 
design, equipment, work practice, operation standard or 
combination thereof, based on the maximum degree or 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act emitted 
from or which results from any emitting installation, which 
the Air Quality Board, on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such installation 
through application of production processes and available 
methods, systems and techniques, including fuel cleaning or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for 
control of such pollutant. 
Utah Admin. Coder. 307-101-2.2 
In April 2003, SPC submitted its PSD permit application to construct a 
270 megawatt coal-fired power plant. The power generation technology SPC proposed 
for the facility is a circulating fluidized bed ("CFB") boiler. DAQ determined that the 
B ACT regulation did not require the consideration of carbon dioxide (or other 
greenhouse gases), or the inclusion of IGCC, in the BACT analysis, and therefore the 
resulting permit did not consider or include them. 
Carbon Dioxide 
For well over a year before issuing the AO, DAQ carefully considered SPC's 
application along with numerous environmental studies and hundreds of comments 
submitted by Sierra Club and other entities. Sierra Club now challenges the AO on the 
ground that DAQ failed to consider carbon dioxide in the BACT analysis. However, 
2
 Utah's BACT definition is substantially similar to the federal definition. See 42 
U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
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neither the Clean Air Act nor the Utah Air Conservation Act or their implementing 
regulations regulate carbon dioxide or require its consideration in a BACT analysis. 
Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
Coal gasification is a process whereby coal is thermally converted at high 
temperature and pressure to produce a synthetic syngas, which can then be used in the 
production of chemicals or fuels, or combusted in the generation of electricity. (SPC 
3509.) Combined cycle power generation technology uses a combination of two methods 
of power generation. (SPC 3510.) The first is the thermodynamic cycle, where gas 
turbines combust gas as their main fuel. (Id.) The hot exhaust from the gas turbine then 
flows through a boiler that produces steam, which is then piped to a steam turbine 
generator, to generate additional electricity. (Id.) IGCC is a developing power 
generation technology. (Id.) Unlike CFB technology in which coal is combusted in a 
boiler and steam is produced for turning a steam turbine generator to produce electricity, 
the IGCC process thermally converts coal into syngas, which, after cleaning, can be 
burned in a gas turbine for power generation. (Id.) The integration part of IGCC is very 
difficult to design and to operate. (Id.; see also SPC 4698-99.) 
Sierra Club wanted the Board to order SPC to construct an IGCC facility in order 
to meet BACT requirements instead of allowing SPC to build the proposed CFB facility 
with BACT-level controls installed. However, DAQ determined, and the Board affirmed, 
that IGCC is a "power generation technology, not an emission control technology," that it 
is "not a technology that can be added onto or designed into the proposed CFB 
installation," and that in any event, "IGCC is not an 'available' technology." (SPC 4699, 
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4700.) The Board also held that "the BACT requirement is not to be used 'as a means to 
redefine the design of the source when considering available emission control options/" 
and found that "[b]ecause of the fundamental differences between CFB and IGCC, 
requiring the inclusion of IGCC would effectively require SPC to redefine the design of 
its proposed CFB installation." (Id.) In addition, the Board found that of the numerous 
states that have considered whether to include IGCC in a BACT analysis, "only three 
(Illinois, New Mexico, and Montana) did so, and Montana has since determined that 
IGCC not be included." (Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. CARBON DIOXIDE 
Sierra Club has failed to demonstrate any error in the Board's affirmation of 
DAQ's issuance of the AO. Sierra Club first claims that the Board erred by reviewing 
the Original BACT Regulation rather than the Revised BACT Regulation. In fact, the 
Board reviewed the very version that Sierra Club asked the Board to review in its 
Requests for Agency Action—the version that was in place at the time the BACT 
analysis was conducted and the AO was issued. In any event, the Revised BACT 
Regulation did not substantively change the BACT requirement, but was made for mere 
ease of use. Moreover, even if the Revised BACT Regulation had substantively changed 
the BACT requirement, such change certainly would not apply retroactively. 
The BACT requirement only requires the consideration of "pollutants subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act." Utah 
Admin. Code r. 307-101-2. Sierra Club argues that because certain provisions of law 
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require the reporting of carbon dioxide emissions, carbon dioxide is thus a "pollutant 
subject to regulation." Carbon dioxide, however, is not "subject to regulation," because the 
plain meaning of that phrase requires the actual control of carbon dioxide emissions. The 
reporting requirement, however, does nothing to control carbon dioxide emissions. 
Indeed, because the Clean Air Act and the Utah Air Conservation Act currently allow 
sources to emit carbon dioxide without control or limitation, the Board has never made 
any regulation to control or limit carbon dioxide. In addition the entire PSD regulatory 
scheme presumes the actual control of emissions before the BACT requirement is to be 
imposed. EPA, the very agency charged with administering the PSD permitting program, 
has a longstanding history of interpreting and applying the BACT regulation in this 
manner, and DAQ and the Board have consistently followed that interpretation and 
policy. This Court should grant considerable weight and deference to that interpretation 
and policy. The public policy matter of whether to regulate carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases should be resolved through the general administrative rulemaking 
process, rather than through this case-specific litigation. 
Even the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 
(2007), did not hold that carbon dioxide is a "pollutant subject to regulation," but only 
that it is "pollutant" under the Clean Air Act, which EPA has the statutory authority to 
regulate carbon dioxide IF it chooses to do so. 
Moreover, even if Sierra Club were correct that there is another reasonable 
interpretation of the BACT requirement, that would not carry Sierra Club's heavy burden of 
demonstrating "clear error" in the Board's interpretation. 
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II. IGCC 
Because DAQ was not legally required to include IGCC in its BACT analysis, the 
Board did not err in affirming DAQ's issuance of the AO. To have required the inclusion 
of IGCC would have required SPC to construct an altogether different power generation 
technology, not merely to add an emission control technology to the proposed CFB 
facility. The required BACT emission limitation, however, is to be achieved "through 
application o f available control technology options to the already proposed "installation" 
or generation technology. IGCC is a power generation technology; it is not an emission 
control technology "for control of. . . pollutant[s]." 
Sierra Club, however, attempts to contort the BACT requirements in a misguided 
effort to require SPC to "redefine" its proposed source. EPA and DAQ have a 
longstanding and consistent policy that the BACT requirement should not be used "as a 
means to redefine the design of the source when considering available control 
alternatives." EPA's New Source Review Workshop Manual ("NSR Manual") at B.13. 
And, as even Sierra Club's expert has acknowledged, the equipment used with IGCC 
technology is "very different" from that used with the proposed CFB technology. But, 
rather than asking the Court to interpret the plain language of the BACT regulation, 
Sierra Club suggests an alternative interpretation gleaned from a selective and limited 
portion of the legislative history, i.e., that coal gasification is an "innovative fuel 
combustion technique" and it should have been included in the BACT analysis. 
However, the record demonstrated that IGCC is not an innovative fuel combustion 
technique. And, even if it were it would not have to be included because the BACT 
SaltLake-399687.4 0076000-07002 - 13 -
regulation only requires options that could be applied to the proposed CFB installation, 
not as a substitute for that proposal. Moreover, the cited legislative history does not 
reflect the consensus of the committee that wrote the relevant BACT language, but the 
isolated comments of a single Senator. In any event, where the language of the 
regulation is clear as it is here, there is no need to probe into the competing snippets of 
the legislative history to ascertain the regulation's meaning. Also, 20 of the 22 other 
states that have considered this issue have rejected Sierra Club's unorthodox 
interpretation that would read "Step 1" right out of the five-step BACT process. EPA and 
the Board's interpretation and policy against "redefining the source" are reasonable and 
rational, and any ambiguity in the BACT regulation should be resolved by the agency 
charged with its administration. 
Finally, only available technologies need be included in a BACT analysis. In 
contrast, an innovative technology is one that is "still under development." The Board's 
factual finding that IGCC was not available because it has not yet been "successfully 
demonstrated in practice on full scale operations" is supported by substantial evidence. 
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
The cumulative error doctrine has no application here because the Board did not 
err, and certainly did not err several times over so as to be prejudicial. Even it had erred 
in some respect (although it did not), its errors were certainly not so widespread or 
repeated as to undermine the Court's confidence that a fair trial was had. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CARBON DIOXIDE—The Board Correctly Held That DAP Was Not 
Legally Required to Consider Carbon Dioxide (or Other Greenhouse Gases) 
in Its BACT Analysis 
Neither Congress nor the Utah Legislature has passed any law, and neither the 
EPA nor the Board has promulgated any regulation, that requires a source to control 
carbon dioxide emissions. Indeed, of the numerous times this issue has been addressed by 
permitting authorities and courts, PacifiCorp is aware of only one (a lower court decision 
in Georgia) that has ever required carbon dioxide to be considered in a BACT analysis.3 
In other words, Sierra Club is attempting to impose a legal requirement on SPC 
that simply does not exist. Relying on Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. 1438, in which the 
Supreme Court concluded that carbon dioxide is a "pollutant" that EPA has the authority 
to regulate if it so chooses, Sierra Club now asks this Court to impose a legal requirement 
as if EPA or the Board had already exercised its authority to promulgate regulations to 
control carbon dioxide. Although Congress, the Utah Legislature, EPA, and/or the Board 
MAY consider imposing requirements to control carbon dioxide or other greenhouse 
gases in the future, because it remains an unregulated pollutant, DAQ had no duty, and 
indeed no authority, to consider it in a BACT analysis. 
The Board's dismissal of Sierra Club's claim is consistent with the applicable 
statutes and regulations, and the longstanding policy of the agency charged with 
3
 Friends of the Chattahoochee v. Couch, 2008CV146398 (Fulton Co. Ga, June 
30, 2008). The decision is based upon the same faulty interpretation of Massachusetts 
and incomplete analysis as the Sierra Club employs in this case. 
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administering those regulations. Moreover, the Board's affirmation of DAQ5s 
interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to some deference by this Court. 
A. The Board Did Not Err in Applying the Original BACT Regulation 
1. The Board Reviewed the Very Version of the BACT Regulation 
That Sierra Club Asked the Board to Review 
As detailed above under the Statement of Grounds to Deny Review of 
Unpreserved Issue, DAQ issued the October 2004 AO on the premise that the underlying 
BACT analysis was in conformance with the then existing Original BACT Regulation. 
In 2006, the Board revised and renumbered the regulation for mere ease of use. 
Apparently acknowledging its applicability, Sierra Club again asked the Board to review 
the Original BACT Regulation to determine whether DAQ should have considered 
carbon dioxide. (Amended Request for Agency Action at 3.) Now, for the first time, 
Sierra Club argues that the Board erred in reviewing the very version of the BACT 
regulation that Sierra Club asked it to review. For this reason alone, the Court should 
summarily reject Sierra Club's claim. 
2. The Revised BACT Regulation Does Not Change the BACT 
Requirement to Now Require the Regulation of Carbon Dioxide 
In 2006 the Board revised and moved the BACT regulation from the definitional 
section of Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101 into the operative section of Utah Admin. Code 
r. 307-401. The "Summary of Change" portion of the regulatory history provides that the 
change was made "because the term [BACT is] used only in the new text for R307-401." 
23 Utah Bull. 14 (Dec. 1, 2005). In other words, this change was made for mere ease of 
use by unifying the terms and renumbering the sections. This change certainly does not 
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reflect any intention to change the substance of what was to be regulated (i.e., to now 
include carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases). 
Neither Congress nor the Utah Legislature, and neither EPA nor the Board, has 
ever regulated carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases. As the Board has just recently 
reaffirmed, "[ijnasmuch as the Board has never adopted rules governing carbon dioxide 
or other greenhouse gases, it has not, as a matter of law, required limitations or 
consideration of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases as part of the approval order or 
permit process." (Final Order.) If the Board were to reverse its longstanding policy of 
not regulating carbon dioxide, it would have to do so through a formal rulemaking 
process, not through an insignificant organizational change in the BACT regulation.4 
3. If the Revised BACT Regulation Had Changed the BACT 
Requirement to Require Consideration of Carbon Dioxide, Such 
Change Would Not Apply Retroactively 
It is well settled that a change in a statute or regulation of "substantive law" or of 
law that affects "vested rights" does not apply retroactively, whereas a change may be 
applied retroactively if it is purely procedural or a clarification or when "the legislature 
has clearly expressed" its intention of retroactive application. Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre 
Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (holding that change during appeal of agency's 
decision did not apply retroactively because amendment was a change in "substantive" 
4
 This is reinforced by the retention and synonymous use of the term "pollutant" in 
the Revised BACT Regulation. See Utah Admin. Code R. 307-401-2 (stating that "[ijn 
no event shall the application of best available control technology result in emissions of 
any pollutant which would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard 
under CFR parts 60 and 61" (emphasis added)). 
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law); State Dep 't ofSoc. Servs. v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982) (stating 
"procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit which do not enlarge, 
eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights apply not only to future actions, but also 
to accrued and pending actions as well"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (stating "[n]o 
part of [the Utah Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared").5 
Sierra Club wants it both ways. For purposes of forcing the consideration of 
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in BACT analyses it argues the change 
constitutes a substantive reversal of the longstanding policy against regulating carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases, yet for purposes of invoking the case law that says 
changes for mere clarification can be applied retroactively it argues the change is a mere 
clarification. (Pet'r Br. 20.) Notwithstanding the alternating labels that Sierra Club 
attempts to employ (reversal or clarification), a change that creates a "substantive change 
to the prior law" cannot be applied retroactively. State v. One Lot of Personal Property, 
2004 UT 36, f 10, 900 P.3d 639; Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261 ("A long-standing rule of 
statutory construction is that we do not apply retroactively legislation enactments that 
alter substantive law or effect vested rights."). A "substantive change" is affected if the 
revision changes a section that "regulate[s] the rights and duties of the parties." Olsen, 
956 P.2d at 261 (holding that amendment regulating largely procedural aspect of 
worker's compensation claim was nonetheless a "substantive" change). 
5
 In contrast, the general rule for a change in case law during an appeal is that the 
"stated law of a decision is effective both prospectively and retrospectively, even [when] 
a decision . . . overrules prior law." Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 
1992). 
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Moreover, the BACT requirement has never been applied so as regulate carbon 
dioxide or other greenhouse gases for purposes of BACT analyses. In re Kawaihae 
Cogeneration Project, 7 E.A.D. 107 (E.A.B. 1997). Sierra Club argues that the Board's 
use of the term "contaminant" in the Revised BACT Regulation, rather than "pollutant 
subject to regulation" in the Original BACT Regulation, constitutes a dramatic change so 
as to now regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. Such a monumental 
change on such a significant issue, however, would certainly constitute a "substantive 
change to the prior law."6 Thus, although the regulatory history references the 
amendment as a mere clarification, Sierra Club's interpretation would, in fact, be a 
"substantive change to the prior law" or would "affect vested rights" that would render 
the change inapplicable retroactively. 
B. The Board Correctly Held that DAQ Was Not Legally Required to 
Consider Carbon Dioxide in Its BACT Analysis Because Carbon 
Dioxide Is Not a Pollutant "Subject to Regulation" Under the Clean Air 
Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act. 
Carbon dioxide is not a "pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act 
and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act." Utah Admin. Code 307-101-2 (2005). Neither 
6
 Such a reversal would also, as in Olsen, "affect vested rights" because a permit is 
a vested right "which [can]not be arbitrarily taken away by a change in a subsequent... 
ordinance." Judkins v. Fronk, 234 P.2d 849, 851 (Utah 1951) (holding that "appellant 
had lost whatever rights he had" from his building permit by allowing his permit to 
expire before change in zoning ordinance). Sierra Club misapplies Heideman v. 
Washington City, 2007 UT App 11,^21, 155 P.3d 900, to assert that a permit does not 
create a "vested" property interest. In Heideman, the "property interests" at issue were 
"water impact fees," not permits. 2007 UT App 11,^17. The court explicitly 
distinguished fees from permits, stating, "a water impact fee is not a 'permit.'" Id. at 
Tf 19. That the AO was still subject to appeal certainly does not mean that SPC did not 
have a vested right to those interests, qualified as they were, conveyed by the AO. 
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the Clean Air Act nor the Utah Air Conservation Act requires the regulation of carbon 
dioxide. Accordingly, neither EPA nor the Board—the agencies charged with 
administering the Clean Air Act and the PSD permitting program—has ever made a rule 
regulating carbon dioxide. See, e.g., In re Kawaihae, 7 E.A.D. 107 (upholding agency's 
conclusion that "at this time there are no regulations or standards prohibiting, limiting or 
controlling the emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources. Carbon dioxide is 
not considered a regulated pollutant for permitting purposes."). 
EPA and DAQ's interpretation and policy are supported by the plain language of 
the BACT regulation, which interpretation should be given considerable deference. In 
any event, this issue of whether to start regulating carbon dioxide should be resolved 
through legislation or administrative rulemaking rather than litigation. 
1. The Plain Meaning of the Phrase Pollutant "Subject to Regulation" 
Requires Actual Control or Limits of Emissions 
a. A Mere Reporting Requirement Does Not "Subject" Carbon 
Dioxide to "Regulation" 
The only substances required to be considered in a BACT analysis are 
"pollutant[s] subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air 
n 
In any event, Utah Code Ann. § 19-2-106 would prohibit the Board from making 
any rule "for the purpose of administering a program under the federal Clean Air Act" 
that would be "more stringent than the corresponding federal regulations which address 
the same circumstances." The creation of a new state rule that would be more stringent 
than the current federal rule (which does not regulate carbon dioxide) would necessarily 
violate this statutory prohibition. 
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Conservation Act." Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101-2 (2005). Carbon dioxide, however, 
is not a regulated pollutant for purposes of BACT analyses, or for any other purpose.8 
Sierra Club's only contrary argument is that carbon dioxide is "subject to 
regulation" by virtue of Section 821 of Public Law 101-549 ("Section 821"), which 
requires EPA to "to require that all affected sources subject to Title V . . . shall also 
monitor carbon dioxide emissions . . . [and to] require that such data be reported." 42 
U.S.C. § 7651k, note (a). The only support Sierra Club offers for this argument is an 
inference by omission—that "[n]othing in the text of the Act" suggests that "requiring 
monitoring and reporting of a pollutant does not qualify as a 'regulation' for determining 
which pollutants are subject to the BACT requirement." (Pet'r Br. 23-24.) 
A mere reporting provision, however, does not subject carbon dioxide to 
"regulation" because the plain meaning of this term requires control of carbon dioxide 
emissions. Black's Law Dictionary defines "regulation" as "[t]he act or process of 
controlling by rule or restriction." Black's Law Dictionary 1311 (8th ed. 1999) 
The federal regulatory definition of "regulated NSR pollutant," which Sierra 
Club cites in its brief, "means the following: (i) Any pollutant for which a national 
ambient air quality standard has been promulgated . . . ; (ii) Any pollutant that is subject 
to any standard promulgated under section 111 of the Act; (iii) Any Class I or II 
substance subject to a standard promulgated under or established by Title VI of the Act; 
or (iv) Any pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act; except that any 
or all hazardous air pollutants." 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50). Carbon dioxide does not fit 
within any of those four categories. In the preamble that accompanies the definition of 
"regulated NSR pollutant," the agency specifically listed those pollutants that fell within 
the definition. [PSD] and Nonattainment New Source Review (NSR), 67 Fed. Reg. 
80,186, 80,204 (Dec. 31, 2002). Notably absent is carbon dioxide. See also In re Inter-
Power of New York Inc., 5 E.A.D. 130, 151 (E.A.B. 1994) (holding that carbon dioxide 
is "unregulated pollutant," and thus fell outside scope of PSD permit applicant's BACT 
analysis). 
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(emphasis added). In the preamble to the very first PSD regulations promulgated in 
1978, EPA explained that the term "subject to regulation . . . includes all criteria pollutants 
subject to NAAQS review, pollutants regulated under the Standards of Performance for 
new Stationary Sources (NSPS), pollutants regulated under the National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), and all pollutants regulated under 
Title II of the Act regarding emission standards for mobile sources." 43 Fed. Reg. 
26,397 (June 19, 1978). Each of these provisions involves actual control of emissions. In 
In re Kawaihae, the Environmental Appeals Board (the "EAB") explained that the 
permitting authority did not err in concluding that "[cjarbon dioxide is not considered a 
regulated air pollutant for permitting purposes" because "at this time there are no 
regulations or standards prohibiting, limiting or controlling the emissions of greenhouse 
gases." 7 E.A.D. at 132.9 Because mere reporting does not control carbon dioxide or other 
9
 Other provisions of the Clean Air Act also presuppose control of carbon dioxide 
emissions before BACT analysis applies. For example, section 7475(e) states that the 
BACT analysis "shall be preceded by an analysis . . . of the ambient air quality at the 
proposed site . . . for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter... for purposes 
of detennining whether emissions from such facility will exceed the maximum allowable 
increases or the maximum allowable concentration [of the pollutant] permitted under this 
part'" 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). Before any pollutant may be 
subjected to BACT analysis, then, there must be existing limits—i.e., "maximum allowable 
increases" or a "maximum allowable concentration"—for that pollutant. But EPA has not 
made any endangerment finding for carbon dioxide, and thus has not proposed "maximum 
allowable" increases or concentrations for carbon dioxide. Similarly, the definition of 
"best available control technology" states that "[i]n no event shall application of BACT 
result in emissions of any pollutants which will exceed the emissions allowed by Section 
111 or 112 of the Clean Air Act." Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101-2 (emphasis added). 
Again, the application of BACT presupposes an existing standard imposed in the Clean Air 
Act. But EPA has not made an endangerment finding for carbon dioxide, let alone 
(continued...) 
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greenhouse gas emissions, it does not subject them to "regulation" for purposes of BACT. 
This is confirmed by subsequent decisions relating to that reporting requirement. In In re 
Inter-Power, 5 E.A.D. at 151, the petitioner argued that the permitting authority should 
have imposed a BACT emissions limit on carbon dioxide. The EAB, however, rejected 
this argument, explaining that "carbon dioxide and hydrogen chloride are . . . unregulated 
pollutants." Id. Significantly, this decision was issued after EPA had imposed the 
reporting requirement implementing Section 821. 
Finally, Sierra Club's argument ignores the additional statutory requirement that 
the pollutant be "subject to" regulation. The plain meaning of the phrase "subject to" 
also requires control. Webster's, for example, defines "subject" as "being under 
domination, control, or influence (often fol. by to)." Random House Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary 1893 (2d ed. 2001). A pollutant is not "subject to" regulation, 
(. . . continued) 
promulgated standards under section 111 or 112. Sierra Club's interpretation of "subject to 
regulation" thus renders this critical portion of the BACT regulation meaningless. 
10
 In 1993, after it promulgated regulations implementing Section 821, EPA issued 
an interpretation specifically considering whether the carbon dioxide reporting program 
instituted under Section 821 rendered carbon dioxide "subject to regulation" under the 
Clean Air Act. Memorandum from L.N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality 
Planning and Standards, Definition of Regulated Air Pollutant for Purposes of Title V 
(Apr. 26, 1993), http://www.epa.gov/region07/programs/artd/air/title5/t5memos/rapdef.pdf. 
The Wegman memo concluded that carbon dioxide was not a "pollutant subject to 
regulation" because, among other things, section 821 "involve[d] actions such as 
reporting and study, not actual control of emissions." Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in a Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel to Carol M. 
Browner, Administrator, EPA's Authority to Regulate Pollutants Emitted by Electric 
Power Generation Sources, at 5 (Apr. 10, 1998), EPA concluded that until "the 
Administrator has made [a] determination . . . to exercise [his] authority [to regulate 
carbon dioxide] under the specific criteria provided under" the Act—including an 
endangerment finding—carbon dioxide is not "subject to regulation." 
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then, unless a regulation "controls" emissions of the pollutant. In short, facilities that 
must report their carbon dioxide emissions may themselves be "subject to regulation," but 
their emissions of carbon dioxide—which can be unlimited—are not. The Clean Air Act 
repeatedly distinguishes whether it is referring to a "pollutant subject to regulation" or a 
particular "source subject to regulation."11 Congress did just that in the BACT regulation, 
ensuring that BACT would apply only when Congress had subjected a "pollutant" to 
regulation, not just a "source."12 
b. Carbon Dioxide Is Not Regulated "Under the Clean Air Act," 
Because Section 821 Is Not Part of the Act 
Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101-2 requires a BACT analysis only for each "pollutant 
subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act" 
(emphasis added). Sierra Club makes no assertion, and provides no legal support for its 
inference, that Section 821 is part of the Clean Air Act. 
11
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7475(e)(1) ("pollutant subject to regulation"); id. 
§ 7479(3) ("pollutant subject to regulation"); id. § 7412(c)(3) ("sources . . . subject to 
regulation"); id. § 7412(f)(1)(A) ("sources subject to regulation"). 
12
 The context of the PSD regulatory scheme presumes the actual control of 
emissions before the imposition of BACT. The BACT regulation does not purport to 
define which pollutants must be subject to regulatory control, let alone bring new pollutants 
under control. It merely establishes one means of reducing emissions (i.e., BACT) for 
pollutants already "subject to regulation." Viewed in this context, the plain meaning of 
the phrase "pollutant subject to regulation" contemplates, as a prerequisite, a clear 
expression of intent elsewhere in the Clean Air Act to control emissions of the pollutant in 
question. Sierra Club's interpretation would make the narrow PSD permitting context 
the only context in which control of carbon dioxide emissions was required. Instead, the 
BACT requirements operates as a supplement to, not in place of, emission controls or 
limits (such New Source Performance Standards, National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, and emission standards for mobile sources). 
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Section 821 of Public Law 101-549 is not part of the Clean Air Act itself. Indeed, 
Congress indicated, in plain language, that Section 821 was not part of the Clean Air Act. 
Public Law 101-549 obviously contained many provisions amending the Clean Air Act, 
but not every provision did so. Throughout the legislation, Congress made clear when 
it was adding or altering a provision of the Clean Air Act and when it was not. When 
it wanted to amend the Act, Congress used specific amendatory language: e.g., 
"Title III of the Clean Air Act is amended by adding the following new section after 
section 327." Pub. L. 101-549, § SOI; see also, e.g., id. § 802(a) ("Subparagraphs (A) 
and (B) of section 105(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act are amended to read as follows."). 
Section 821, by contrast, contains no expression of amendatory intent. It is included 
as a freestanding provision in Title VIII of the Public Law, entitled "Miscellaneous 
Provisions." Many other "Miscellaneous Provisions" of Title VIII were likewise 
freestanding provisions and made no changes to the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., id. 
§§ 807, 808. None of these provisions—including Section 821—ever became part of the 
As arranged and codified by the Office of Law Revision Counsel of the 
U.S. House of Representatives, the language of Section 821 was never incorporated into 
the codification of any portion of the Clean Air Act. For ease of reference, the codifiers 
placed it with the sections of the U.S. Code that contain the Clean Air Act's provisions, 
likely because of its relation to the subject matter involved, but included it only as an 
explanatory note following 42 U.S.C. § 7651k. By law, of course, although the 
U.S. Code may be used as "prima facie evidence" of the law in effect, the U.S. Statutes at 
Large, consisting of the publication, in chronological order, of the Public Laws passed by 
Congress and signed by the President, remains the ultimate authority. 1 U.S.C. § 112. 
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Clean Air Act. In addition, subsequent statements of Congress confirm that Section 821 
was never intended to be part of the Clean Air Act.15 
c. The Only Case Law Cited by Sierra Club Actually Supports 
the Board's Position 
In Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court 
reaffirmed EPA's longstanding interpretation of "subject to regulation." There, industry 
groups argued that the newly enacted PSD provisions covered only the two pollutants for 
which Congress had actually already established PSD increments (sulfur dioxide and 
particulate matter), but not pollutants for which EPA was required to promulgate emission 
controls but had not yet done so. Id. In rejecting this argument, the court explained that 
once Congress has "regulated" a pollutant under the Clean Air Act—by unequivocally 
requiring EPA to promulgate regulations controlling the emissions of that pollutant—PSD 
Another difference between the freestanding provisions and those that actually 
amended the Clean Air Act is how each set of provisions referred to the Act itself. The 
provisions that actually amended and were incorporated into it refer to the Clean Air Act 
as "this Act." See, e.g., Pub. L. 101-549, § 701 (amending section 113(a)(4) of Clean 
Air Act to state that "[n]o order issued under this subsection shall prevent the State or the 
Administrator from assessing any penalties nor otherwise affect or limit the State's or the 
United States authority to enforce under other provisions of this Act, nor affect any person's 
obligations to comply with any section of this Act" (emphasis added)). Section 821, by 
contrast, refers not to "this Act" but to "the Clean Air Act." See, e.g., id. § 821(a) 
(stating that Administrator "shall promulgate regulations . . . to require that all affected 
sources subject to title [IV] of the Clean Air Act shall also monitor carbon dioxide 
emissions" (emphasis added)). 
15
 The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which publishes a 
compilation of acts within its jurisdiction (including the Clean Air Act), includes 
Section 821 in a section among "Provisions of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
(Public Law 101-549) That Did Not Amend the Clean Air Act. " See H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, Compilation of Selected Acts within the Jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce 451-52 (Comm. Print 2001). 
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appropriate level of emissions control. Each pollutant at issue in Alabama Power was 
either already subject to emission controls or was governed by a provision of the Clean 
studies. Here, by contrast, there is no requirement to control emissions of carbon dioxide or 
other greenhouse gases, and EPA has not made any endangerment finding that would 
supreme Court 
itself emphasized in Massachusetts that EPA need not (and cannot) regulate carbon dioxide 
unless and until it "makes a finding of endangerment," 127 S. Ct. at 1462. 
2. EPA, DAQ and the Board Have a Reasonable and Longstanding 
Interpretation of the BACT Requirement to Which the Court Should 
Give Deference 
As addressed in Section B. 1 .a, supra, EPA has a longstanding history of 
and the Board have consistently followed. The agenc) 's interpretation and policy are 
entitled to significant weight and deference. King, 850 P.2d at 1287 ("[CJonsideration of 
an agency's expertise and experience is relevant in determining whether the agency 
should make the necessary policy choice and thus be granted deferent ' 
court."); Sorge, 2006 UT App 2, ^j17 (deference should be extended to the agency 
because :
 t_ , .:s experience or expertise, is in a better position than [we are] to 
give effect to the regulatory objective to be achie \ eel" (citation omitted)). 
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3. The Pubic Policy Issue of Whether to Start Regulating Carbon 
Dioxide Should Be Resolved Through Legislation or Administrative 
Rulemaking, Not Litigation 
Sierra Club's attempt to reinterpret the BACT rule is tantamount to a rulemaking 
in that the rule, which has never been interpreted or applied to require the consideration 
of carbon dioxide as part of a BACT analysis, would be completely reversed. Courts and 
commentators have long "shown near unanimity in extolling the virtues of the rule-
making process over making 'rules' through case-by-case adjudication." David L. 
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking and Adjudication in the Development of 
Administrative Policy, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 922 (1965). 
EPA is in the process of deciding whether to make an endangerment finding for 
carbon dioxide. Sierra Club's petition would short-circuit this process by changing the 
status quo to require the consideration of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases in BACT 
analyses without the benefit of notice and public comment rulemaking, but through the 
remand of a single PSD permit. If the Court were to adopt Sierra Club's reinterpretation, 
it could have sweeping consequences that far surpass this present dispute. 
C. Congress's Exemption of "Hazardous Air Pollutants" from PSD 
Requirements Is Irrelevant to Whether Carbon Dioxide Is Subject to 
Regulation. 
Sierra Club references subsection (iv) of 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(50) for the obvious 
proposition that "hazardous air pollutants" are exempted from the definition of "regulated 
NSR pollutants," but self-servingly omits the full text of that exemption—"(iv) Any 
pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the Act; except.. . any or all 
hazardous air pollutants." The category of pollutants from which hazardous air pollutants 
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"subject to regulation under the Act." Id. In other words, to keep carbon dioxide outside 
the definition of a "regulated NSR pollutant" Congress did not need to exempt it from the 
eategoi \ ol |HIIIIII<IIII . ollh i wise alitMih "subpvl tu ivjp.tililii»ii iitnk i \\\c Ai t" ,i% in ilini • 
with hazardous air pollutants, because, unlike hazardous air pollutants, carbon dioxide 
has never been in the category of pollutants already "subject to regulation under the Act." 
D, Even After Massachusetts•, Carbon Dioxide Remains an Unregulated 
Pollutant, and Need Not Be Considered in BACT Analyses 
Sierra Club suggests that because the Supreme Court has recently determined that 
carbon dioxide is a "pollutant" under the L ...... < necessarily , f ! - , jiat carbon 
dioxide is a pollutant "subject to regulate.'- • *.i* - ' • Aii 
Conservation Act" for purposes of BACT. First, contrary to Siena Club's suggestion, the 
holding of Massachusetts was not that carbon dioxide is a "pollutant subject to 
regulatioi t " bi it onb tii 
that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate carbon dioxide if it chooses to do so. 127 
S. Ct at 1463 ("We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must 
the event that it makes such a finding."). To date, EPA has chosen to not do so. Second, 
in contrast to the motor vehicle emissions at issue in Massachusetts, Sierra Club ignores 
context of BACT, no permitting authority has ever interpreted the "subject to regulation" 
phrase to extend to pollutants that are not already subject to emission controls. 
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For the foregoing reasons, Sierra Club's attempt to manufacture authority to 
require the consideration of carbon dioxide in a BACT analysis must fail. The Board's 
decision dismissing Sierra Club's claim that DAQ erred by failing to require the 
consideration of carbon dioxide must therefore be affirmed. 
II. IGCC—The Board Did Not Err in Affirming That DAQ Was Not Legally 
Required to Include IGCC in Its BACT Analysis for the SPC Facility 
Under the PSD requirements, an applicant intending to construct such a new 
source must demonstrate that the source will employ BACT for each criteria pollutant 
emitted. The regulation defines BACT as follows: 
[A]n emission limitation and/or other controls to include 
design, equipment, work practice, operation standard or 
combination thereof, based on the maximum degree or 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air conservation Act emitted 
from or which results from any emitting installation, which 
the Air Quality Board, on a case-by-case basis taking into 
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such installation 
through application of production processes and available 
methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning 
or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for 
control of each such pollutant. 
Utah Admin. Code 307-101-2(4) (2005) (emphasis added). 
EPA's "top-down" method is used to determine BACT, which includes five steps: 
(1) identify all available control technology options ("Step 1"), (2) eliminate technically 
infeasible control technologies, (3) rank remaining technologies, (4) evaluate the most 
SaltLake-399687.4 0076000-07002 -30-
effective controls, and (5) select the most effecti vre remaining opti< HI I\lSU Mum lal at 
11,5, The only issue here is whether DAQ was required to include IGCC in Step i. 
A. J Q £ £ Would Be an Altogether Different Power Generation 
Technology, Not an Emission Control Technology Option 
Sierra Club asks the Court to interpret the definition of BACT in an extreme 
manner so as to require a power plant that has already selected one type of power 
generation technology (i.e., IGCC) in the BACT analysis. This approach ignores the 
plain language of the BACT regulation. 
1. The BACT Emission Limitation Is Achieved "Through Application 
o f Available Control Technologies (i.e., Processes, Methods, 
Systems, and Techniques for the Control of Pollutants) to the 
Already Proposed "Installation" or Generation Technology 
Theuseoftheterm ". .staiiaM .^i ...-.»* r< - > * definition makes it clear that the 
installation * • railable 
control technology is to applied to that proposed installation. BACT is defined as "an 
emission limitation,. . . based on the maximum degree or reduction of each pollutant 
16
 Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment ("UPHE") submitted an amicus 
curiae brief, which addressed among other things the subject of IGCC. (UPHE Br. 15.) 
However, UPHE did not in any way address the IGCC issue raised by Sierra Club, i.e., 
whether DAQ was legally required to include IGCC in Step 1. Instead, UPHE's brief on 
the IGCC subject contains only factual assertions as to the alleged potential health 
impacts of the proposed CFB generation technology as compared to IGCC technology. 
(UPHE Br. 15-17.) These factual assertions are irrelevant to the IGCC issue here. 
Moreover, these assertions are in the form of expert opinion, but UPHE never submitted 
an expert report, and these assertions are not part of the appeal record. 
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is achievableybr such installation through application of production processes and 
available methods, systems and techniques . . . for control of each such pollutant." Utah 
Admin. Code r. 307-101-2 (2005) (emphasis added). The term "installation" obviously 
makes reference to the source or power generation technology as it is proposed. The 
Board confirmed and memorialized this approach when it amended the BACT regulation 
in 2006, replacing the term "installation" with the term "proposed stationary source." 
Utah Admin. Code r. 307-401-2. 
It is the applicant, not the permitting authority, that proposes the particular type of 
source or installation. In re Hawaiian Commercial & Sugar Co., 4 E.A.D. 95 (E.A.B. 
1992) ("The State . . . does not have the authority to define the boiler type to be used. 
Instead, it evaluated the anticipated impacts of the facility with the type of boiler 
proposed . . . . " (footnote omitted)). As the Board found, "[a]fter the applicant has 
proposed the type of installation or power generation technology, then through the BACT 
analysis the applicant must identify available emission control technology options for the 
particular installation proposed. (SPC 4697-98 (emphasis added).) Sierra Club should 
See also In re Pennsauken County, N.J., Res. Recovery Facility, 2 E.A.D. 667 
(E.A.B. 1988) (clarifying that "[t]he first step in this approach is to determine, for the 
emission source in question, the most stringent control available." (emphasis added)). 
The EAB held that such objections were to the [municipal waste combustor] source 
proposed, rather than to the control technologies identified, and therefore not reviewable. 
See id. The decision goes on to provide that "[t]he permit conditions that define these 
systems are imposed on the source as the applicant has defined it. Although imposition 
of the conditions may, among other things, have a profound effect on the viability of the 
proposed facility as conceived by the applicant, the conditions themselves are not 
intended to redefine the source, as petitioner [] would have them do." Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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type or design of the proposed source. 
2. IGCC Is Not an Emission Control Technology—It Is Not a Process, 
Method, System, or Technique "for Control of. . . Pollutantfsl" 
SPC selected CFB technology as its installation or power generation soi iree \ s 
addressed above, the B ACT requirement obligates the analysis of emission control 
Icchnulog) options (hal can be applied to the selected installation or generation 
technology. The initial question then is whether K iCC is JI power p.niiTatiOii (almoin1",' 
or an emission control technology, i.e., a "processes . , . methods, systems and 
techniques , , , for control 01 >ollutant[s]," that can be applied to the proposed 
generation soi 11 ce I Jtah A de i 3137 101 2 (2005) >. "I ftei considei ing extensi /'€ 
expert testimony, the Board made factual findings that "IGCC is a power generation 
technology, not an emission control technology." (SPC 4699.) 
An nittiS'iiuii! I i iiilii i! li I Lin Jo'", h» ipiinvsi imthul M>.IMM m la huh|iii 'lor 
the control o f . . . pollutant[s]." Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101-2. In contrast, an 
installation or power generation technology is for generation of power. The Board made 
the proposed CFB installation 'for the control o f . . . pollutant[s].'" (SPC 4699.) Sierra 
Club ignores at every turn that trailing phrase of the definition—"for control of, , . 
p oiliil»'ifit[:>f " For esainplc, Sn:n,i < 'lul> lepealedly label* Ki(.V as a "pmduchuii 
process" or "innovative fuel combustion technique," rather than as a production process 
or innovative fuel combustion technique "for control of.. . pollutants[s]." (Pef r Br. 275 
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28.) Sierra Club disregards the obvious distinction between technologies for the control 
of pollutants and those for the generation of power, and instead argues that IGCC, as a 
generic "process" or "technique/5 must be included. (Pet'r Br. 25.) The BACT 
requirement may well obligate the consideration of certain production processes and 
techniques within a proposed generation source (such as in-bed S02 control processes), 
but it does not obligate the consideration of altogether alternative types or redesigns of 
the proposed source. (SPC 3513.) 
B. BACT Is Not a Means to "Redefine" the Design of the Source 
Even if under the BACT definition IGCC were not deemed a power generation 
technology but instead an emission control technology, Sierra Club's attempted misuse of 
the BACT requirement here would violate EPA and DAQ's longstanding interpretation 
and policy against using BACT to "redefine the design of the source."18 
1. EPA and DAQ Have Adopted an Interpretation and Policy Against 
"Redefining the Source" 
EPA and DAQ have a longstanding policy that the BACT requirement should not 
be used "as a means to redefine the design of the source when considering available 
control alternatives. NSR Manual at B.13. For example, applicants proposing to 
construct a coal-fired electric generator, have not been required by EPA as part of a 
18
 Sierra Club's attempt to reinterpret the state BACT rule is tantamount to a 
rulemaking without public review in that the existing rule, which has never been 
interpreted to require inclusion of IGCC, would be dramatically changed. If the BACT 
requirement is in need of review to consider this aspect, such review should be 
undertaken by the Board in general administrative rulemaking, not case-specific 
litigation. See supra Section I.B.3. 
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turbine may be inherently less polluting per unit product." NSR Manual at B. 13. More 
specifically, "production processes" or "available methods, systems and techniques for 
< ui i l i i i i l rid (Mi In Mini In 11 ii 1111 ill. I in in ' iliiil \* iiiilil i i a l c f i n c ilii;' i l t /si ;»]i o l ( h e . s o m e e 1 ' u e u l n u i b e 
included in the BACT analysis. Id. Both the EPA Administrator and the EAB, as well as 
the DAQ and the Utah Air Board, have consistently applied this policy. See Pennsauken, 
This EPA interpretation and policy has been applied specificall 
and in the same context as SPC's situation hen h\ response to objections to Deseret 
Power 1 i leeIin < - „ • ; . . . . •;,
 t • >, • . -.r. \ reiterated that the Clean Air Act 
did not require that IGCC be evaluated "at or be) ond step 1." and that si ich "alternative 
process would represent a redefinition of the source proposed by the applicant and thus 
need uul be listed as a potentially applicable control option at step 1 " I SI V 4868.),M 
When EPA first developed this policy in Pennsauken, it quoted the definition of 
BACT and concluded that "permit conditions that define these systems are imposed on 
the source as the applicant has defined it." 2 E.A.D. at 673. EPA recognized that it 
would not be possible to conduct a case-by-case review of BACT for each facility 
without to some extent accepting the proposed source as defined by the applicant. 
The EPA's policy against "redefining the source" is based on a reasonable 
reading of the Clean Air Act. The EPA's policy recognizes that although the permitting 
authority may take public comment on and consider "alternatives" to a proposed source 
{see § 165(a)(2)) of the Clean Air Act)5 the subsequent BACT analysis determines which 
control technology option should be applied to the proposed source, without changing the 
fundamental characteristics of that proposed source {see § 169(3)). Sierra Club v. EPA, 
499 F.3d 653, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2007) ("EPA's position is that 'best available control 
technology' does not include redesigning the plant proposed by the permit applicant."). 
j i 
"" In a letter from the Director of EPA's Office of Air Quality, Planning and 
Standards, EPA reiterated its long-established interpretation and policy ("EPA's 
(continued . . .) 
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2. Because of Their Fundamental Differences, Requiring IGCC Would 
Redefine the Design of SPC9s Proposed CFB Installation 
SPC has not proposed a geo-thermal power generation source, a gas-fired 
generation source, a super-critical pulverized coal source or an IGCC source; rather, SPC 
has proposed a CFB source. (SPC 3515-16, 3547.) IGCC, as well as these other 
technologies, is a fundamentally different type of source than the proposed CFB 
technology. (SPC 4873-74 (EPA's Response to Comment #2a, Deseret Power Permit, 
stating that "these fundamental differences in [IGCC and CFB] equipment design are 
sufficient to conclude that the IGCC process would redefine the proposed source.").) A 
redesign for IGCC would involve substantial changes to the proposed CFB installation. 
(SPC 3996.) As even Sierra Club's expert admits, "[w]hile CFB, PC and IGCC share 
common processes," i.e., converting coal into useful energy, "the equipment used to 
accomplish these processes is very different among the three technologies." (SPC 3555.) 
Indeed, IGCC is a completely different generation technology, based on completely 
different concepts. (SPC 3515-16.) After hearing considerable expert testimony (SPC 
3994), the Board made findings of fact that "in a CFB plant, coal is a fuel, whereas in an 
(. .. continued) 
Reiteration Letter"). EPA confirmed that "[a]s noted in prior EPA decisions and 
guidance, EPA does not consider the BACT requirement as a means to redefine the basic 
design of the source or change the fundamental scope of the project. . . . We would not 
include IGCC in the list of potentially applicable control options that is compiled in the 
first step of a top-down BACT analysis. Instead, we believe that an IGCC facility is an 
alternative [source]." Letter from Stephen D. Page, Director, Office of Air Quality, 
Planning and Standards, to Paul Plath (Dec. 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/region07/programs/artd/air/nsr/nsrmemos/igccbact.pdf. Although 
the letter was not issued as a new regulation, and by itself does not create any new legally 
binding effect, the letter does reflect longstanding federal policy. 
SaltLake-399687 4 0076000-07002 
-36-
into a gas. For an IGCC facility, this syngas which is the fuel is then combusted in a 
separate gas turbine power plant, not a boiler . . . Because of the fundamental 
differences kiweeii CFR ;ind l(i( X \ ivquiiiiig the inclusion of !(<('(' "i :n\\U\ rl'leclively 
require SPC to redefine the design of its proposed CFB installation." (SPC 4698-99.) 
3. Rather Than Having the Court Interpret the Plain Language of the 
BACT Regulation, Sierra Club Suggests an Alternative 
Interpretation Gleaned from a Selective and Limited Portion of the 
Legislative History 
Sierra Club argues that Senator Huddleston intended the phrase "innovative fuel 
combustion techniques" to encompass "gasification" or "lo \ v Btu gasification." (Pet'r Br. 
26-27.) First, gasificatio11 i . 11 ol ;i 11 ' 11111< »\ • 11i\ i* 11n• I i i > 1111111.111> 11 11 1111111ft11• <1111i 1111 11n 11 
evidence (expert or otherwise) was presented to the Board. On the contrary, as supported 
by ample expert testimony, coal gasification is a thermochemical conversion process, not 
acombir ;lion Inehniqiir (SIIV }S0*> 10 4(>*)X-()(> ) Secoiitf even ifil rnronipassed 
"gasification," this would not require a permitting authority to consider IGCC. The 
"innovative fuel combustion techniques" term appears in the BACT definition among a 
systems, and techniques." Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101 -2 (2005). Thus the "innovative 
fuel combustion" language, like the phrase it expands, is limited by other language such 
as fir irquiivnienl Ihiil MA( ' 1 be applied only in tin- pioposril unillinn liislalliitioii or 
source. Thus, even if coal gasification were an innovative fuel combustion technique, 
BACT would not require an "innovative fuel combustion technique" to be included in 
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Step 1 when it would redefine the design of the proposed source to the point that it 
becomes an alternative type of source. See generally Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 
655; NSR Manual at B.10, B.13; (SPC 4868-75).22 
The Senator went on to say that the purpose of the amendment was to ensure that 
"all actions taken by the fuel user are to be taken into account." S. Rep. 95-127 (1977). 
This phrase suggests the Senator wanted to make sure that //a fuel user were proposing 
an innovative fuel combustion technique, that such action by the fuel user would be 
considered in the BACT analysis. Thus the Senator's statement should be read to express 
an intent similar to that expressed in a subsequent Congress when adding the phrase 
"clean fuels" to the definition of BACT in 1990. At the time "clean fuels" was added to 
the list that includes "innovative fuel combustion techniques," the relevant Senate 
committee report stated that "the Administrator may consider the use of clean fuels to 
meet BACT if a, permit applicant proposed to meet such requirements using clean 
fue l . . . . In no case is the Administrator compelled to require mandatory use of clean 
fuels by a permit applicant." S. Rep. 101-228, 3721 (1989) (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, Sierra Club's reliance on the floor comment of a single Senator, and only a 
selective and limited portion of the Senator's comment at that, is misplaced. 
In any event, this language Sierra Club relies on was not the consensus from the 
committee that wrote the relevant BACT language, and did not even make it into the 
actual Senate report. S. Rep. 101-228, at iv. Rather, it is the isolated comment of 
Senator Huddleston when he spoke on the Senate floor. 123 Cong. Rec. S9421 (daily ed. 
June 10, 1977). The Senate report includes consensus language on what the rule means. 
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moment where, as here, contrary congressional intent is clear on the face of both the 
statute and regulation " (IVI 'r Lir. I,!'/.) As an initial matter, as detailed above, there is no 
i onlnuv ani|>irssionnl intra! iefkxleil in the Icgislativi; history In an\ event, Siena 
Club dramatically overstates the extent to which the Board relied on the NSR Manual. 
The Board's Order was premised on 16 separate factual findings and four separate legal 
( n 
easily stands on its own without regard to the NSR Manual. More importantly, if the 
plain language of a statute or regulation is clear, as here, there is no need to parse through 
Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1994) (u[W]e look first to the plain language"). 
EPA (charged with implementing the Clean Air Act), the EAB, the DAQ (charged 
v itlli iiilinimsU'iing I lu: I'Sl!) pio^iani) and (he Utah An Boaiti, and ill ul the 11 other 
states that have considered this issue, have all consistently interpreted I lie KM T 
regulation in the same manner. Conversely, if the language of the regulation is not clear 
enough lu he interpreted without resorting to the legislative history, then it is ambiguous 
and deference to the agency's interpretation is w arranted C hi a ron 46 7 1. J S at 838. 
4. EPA and DAQ's Interpretation and Policy Against "Redefining the 
Source" Are Reasonable, and Any Ambiguity in the Regulation 
Should Be Resolved by the Agency Charged with Implementation 
Of course, the Clean Air Act and the agency's policy do i lot obligate the 
permitting authority to accept all elements of a proposed project—although the policy 
does not require consideration of emission control technologies that would redefine the 
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design of the proposed source, a change that would not constitute a fundamental redesign 
of the proposed source is not prohibited. See Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 655. The 
Clean Air Act thus arguably creates some tension between the obligation to conduct the 
BACT analysis on the "proposed facility" and the concurrent obligation to consider as 
BACT "production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques." If a 
statute is ambiguous as to a specific issue, an agency may formulate a policy to resolve 
the issue, provided that the policy is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; U.S. v. Solar Turbines 732 F. Supp. 535, 539 (M.D. Pa. 1989) 
("Reasonable interpretations of the agency administering the statute are to be upheld."). 
Just how much of a process modification is within the proper scope of a BACT 
analysis is a judgment call within the discretion of the permitting authority. Sierra Club 
v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 655 (recognizing "crucial question where control technology ends 
and a redesign of the 'proposed facility' begins. As it is not obvious where to draw that 
line . . . it makes sense to let the EPA, the author of the underlying distinction, draw it, 
within reason."). In drawing the line, deference should be given to the agency. Id. at 
655 (stating "the kind of judgment by an administrative agency to which a reviewing 
court should defer"). 
The Seventh Circuit also noted that the line or distinction "is one of degree and 
the treatment of differences of degree in a technically complex field with limited 
statutory guidance is entrusted to the judgment of the agency that administers the 
regulatory scheme rather than to courts of generalist judges." Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 
F.3d at 656 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). 
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5. The Board Did Not Conclude that the NSR Manual Prohibited 
Consideration of IGCC 
Sierra Club s caption in this section of its brief states that "[e]ven if resort to 
agency interpretation. - ••; :t 
the NSR Manual prohibits consideration of IGCC." (Pet'r Br. 28.). On the contrary, the 
Board only concluded that "[b]ecause the law does not require the inclusion of IGCC, the 
i 
Sierra Club cites to the NSR Manual for its categorical proposition that "[a]n> top-
down BACT analysis should consider inherently lower polluting processes along with 
inlil our " II'. Til Hi lin" I. liivi, 
applicable" which appear in the actual language of the NSR Manual ("should consider 
potentially applicable"). NSR Manual at B.10. Processes which are not "potentially 
technologies other than for the "control of. . . pollutant[s]," or are "unavailable," or are 
otherwise not applicable need not be considered.24 
In suppoi t of its i equest that the Court reinterpret the BAG I ' regulation and 
disregard EPA and DAQ's longstanding interpretation of their own, regi llations, Siei ra 
Club offers up an article urging that IGCC "must" be part of a BACT analysis. (Pet'r 
24
 Sierra Club acknowledges the NSR Manual provision which states that 
"[historically, EPA has not considered the BACT requirements as a means to redefine 
the design of the source when considering available control alternatives," but argues that 
there is "no rational reason" to be constrained by that history "given the EPA's own 
guidance that entirely different 'processes/practices' be considered." (Pet'r Br. 29.) 
Sierra Club does not and cannot cite to any such guidance mandating or even suggest 
that "entirely different" processes/practices be considered. 
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Br. 30.) By characterizing this article as an "EPA 'white paper/" Sierra Club invites the 
erroneous inference that the article was prepared or endorsed by EPA. On the contrary, it 
was written by the Clean Air Task Force, an environmental advocacy group engaged in 
"public education, and legal advocacy." See Clean Air Task Force Website, 
http://www.catf.us/about_us/. That this particular group may believe that IGCC should 
be included in BACT analyses has no bearing on what the law requires. Even if it did, 
Sierra Club makes no suggestion that this article was included as part of the record. 
6. Almost All of the States That Have Considered This Issue Have 
Agreed with EPA and DAQ's Interpretation, and Have Adopted the 
Policy Against "Redefining the Source" 
Sierra Club cleverly asserts that "other states have required that Step 1 of BACT 
analysis include IGCC," and then identifies New Mexico and Illinois as having done so. 
(Pet'r Br. 30.) What Sierra Club conspicuously omits is the fact—not to mention the 
Board's finding—that the TWENTY-ONE other states that have addressed this issue 
have not required the inclusion of IGCC.26 SPC 4699-4700. ALL of the others have 
Sierra Club asserts that New Mexico, Illinois "and Montana" have required 
developers to address IGCC as BACT, but then acknowledges that "Montana may no 
longer do so." (Pet'r Br. 30.) In fact, Montana has never concluded that the law requires 
the inclusion of IGCC. In an earlier decision Montana held that IGCC "should" have 
included IGCC, but Montana has since changed its position and has affirmatively insisted 
that the law does not require the inclusion of IGCC, and that "the Department does not 
believe that redefining the source is appropriate." SPC 4645. In addition, the Illinois 
decision is irrelevant here because the 1/14/05 permit in question there had not even been 
issued at the time Utah DAQ issued its 10/12/04 permit to SPC here. Furthermore, 
Illinois's inclusion of IGCC in that 1/14/05 permit has largely been rendered moot by 
Sierra Club v. EPA, 499 F.3d at 653, as addressed above. 
26
 Sierra Club asserts that Michigan "has proposed to require inclusion of IGCC" 
in any BACT analysis (Pet'r Br. 30.) Significantly, Michigan is not proposing to 
(continued.. .) 
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agreed with Utah DAQ and the Board. Id. See Summary of State Determinations re 
Inclusion of IGCC in BACT. SPC4644. 
Moreover, as to New Mexico and Illinois, they did not determine that the BACT 
regulation required them to include IGCC; rather, because "this is an aspect of the PSD 
permitting process in which states have the discretion to engage in a broader analysis if 
they so desire," NSR Manual at B.13, they determined that the BACT regulation allowed 
a broader analysis and they exercised their discretion to have the applicant include 
(. .. continued) 
reinterpret the BACT regulation so as to require the inclusion of IGCC. Instead, 
Michigan recognizes that the BACT regulation does not require the inclusion of IGCC 
and has proposed a rulemaking process to ascertain whether an altogether new regulation 
should be adopted so as to require the inclusion of IGCC. See Fact Sheet re 
Environmental Permitting of Coal-Fired Power Plants in Michigan (July 26, 2007), 
www.deq.state.mi.us/aps/downloads/permits/igccfact%20rev%207-26-07.pdf. Moreover, 
in making this proposal, the MDEQ noted that "Michigan has unique geological 
formations which could make carbon sequestration in Michigan both economically and 
technically advantageous." Id. Thus, Michigan DEQ's decision to undertake a 
rulemaking was based on the fact that IGCC is believed to offer unique advantages 
particular to that State. Significantly, the public comment period for this proposal ended 
back on September 14, 2007, and Michigan has not adopted such a rule. 
27
 Sierra Club baldly asserts that "Kentucky's position is unclear." (Pet'r Br. 30.) 
On the contrary, in responding to comments from Sierra Club in connection with an air 
permit application for a new CFB facility, Kentucky reaffirmed its position that IGCC 
would result in an impermissible redefinition of the basic design of the project and 
therefore was not required to be considered under a BACT analysis. SPC 4644. The 
Kentucky DAQ explained that "it is the Division's understanding of the BACT review 
process that a fundamental redefinition of the project to an IGCC process is not 
required." Id. The DAQ issued the permit on July 31, 2006. Sierra Club filed an appeal 
to the federal EPA. In its Order, the EPA noted that Sierra Club was just making the 
same IGCC argument it had made in its comments to the permit, and EPA reiterated that 
it and EAB "have long maintained a policy against utilizing the BACT requirement as a 
means to fundamentally redefine the basic design or scope of a proposed project." Id. 
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IGCC. Notably, the Board found that neither of these two states that included IGCC in 
Step 1 went on to conclude that IGCC is BACT, but rather rejected IGCC under 
subsequent Steps. (SPC 4699-4700.) 
Sierra Club also asserts that NESCAUM (an association of eight Northeast States 
for Coordinated Air Use Management), has filed amicus briefs suggesting that IGCC 
"should be included" in BACT analyses, and that this "foretells these states' position . . . 
if and when they directly confront the issues." (Pet'r Br. 31.) Significantly, these states 
have not yet confronted this issue for power plants proposed within their borders. But 
even more importantly, whether one of more of these states decide that IGCC "should be 
included" as a matter of discretionary policy is irrelevant to the issue here of whether the 
law requires that IGCC be included. 
Sierra Club notes that the National Park Service commented that it believes IGCC 
should have been included in the BACT analysis. (Pet'r Br. 31.) If this Court is to give 
deference to any federal agency as to how the Clean Air Act and its implementing 
regulations should be interpreted, that agency should be the EPA, not the Park Service. 
In the Illinois Prairie State matter, the decision acknowledged that "nevertheless 
'this is an aspect of the PSD permitting process in which states have the discretion to 
engage in a broader analysis if they so desire.' NSR Manual at B. 13." The decision goes 
on to hold that "this authority is within the sound discretion of the permit issuer, but is 
not required." In re Prairie State Generating Co., PSD Appeal No. 05-05, at 40 (E.A.B. 
Aug. 24, 2006); (SPC 4868-75). Similarly, New Mexico exercised its discretion and had 
Mustang Energy submit an analysis of IGCC in order to make a determination regarding 
BACT for a proposed coal-powered facility. (SPC 4647.) Significantly, nothing in the 
decision letter indicates that the Environmental Department interpreted the BACT 
regulation to require the inclusion of IGCC; rather, the Department exercised its 
discretion and determined that IGCC "should be considered in the BACT analysis." Id. 
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7. The Court Should Decline Sierra Club's Suggestion to Ignore Step 1 
of the Five-Step BACT Process 
Sierra Club argues that "the place to address concerns about the impact of 
redesigning the process should be the latter phases of the five-step, top-down BACT 
process." (Pet'r Br. 31.) Contrary to established rules of statutory and regulatory 
interpretation, under Sierra Club's interpretation, Step 1 would be read right out of the 
regulation. See In re Adoption ofT.K, 2007 UT App 341, f 14, 171 P.3d 480. 
Under Sierra Club's argument, not only would SPC have been required to consider 
IGCC as an option to the proposed CFB source, but SPC would have been required to 
consider other fundamentally redefined designs such as a super-critical pulverized coal 
boiler, a gas-fired boiler, biomass feedstocks, geo-thermal units, wind turbines, solar 
panels, etc. Of course, as clearly articulated in the NSR Manual, "[t]he objective in step 
1 is to identify all control options with potential application to the source. . . under 
evaluation." NSR Manual at B.10 (emphasis added). Without Step 1 the applicant 
would have to identify and consider all options with potential application to anything, 
rather than options "with potential application to the source . . . under evaluation." 
Against the backdrop of real-world BACT analysis, Sierra Club's interpretation is 
entirely unworkable. 
C. IGCC Is Not an "Available" Technology 
Even if IGCC were not deemed a power generation technology, and even if 
inclusion of IGCC in Step 1 would not constitute an impermissible "redefining" of the 
source, IGCC would still not be an "available" technology under Step 1. 
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1. The Board Did Not Misinterpret the Term "Available" 
Sierra Club acknowledges that only "available" technologies need be included. 
(Pet'r Br. 32; see also SPC 4700.) After receiving extensive expert testimony and after 
considering exhaustive legal analysis, the Board made a finding of fact that IGCC was 
not available, and based thereon, concluded that IGCC was not required to be included. 
(SPC 4700-01.) Sierra Club asserts that the Board misread the BACT regulation as to the 
meaning of "available." More specifically, Sierra Club cites to the criterion from the 
NSR Manual as to what is and is not "available," but then omits key language from that 
criterion. (Pet'r Br. 32.) The criterion is not, as Sierra Club asserts, whether IGCC has 
merely been demonstrated "in practice," but rather "successfully demonstrated in practice 
on full scale operations" NSR Manual at B.22 (emphasis added). Sierra Club argues 
that the Board's interpretation of "available" is too narrow and contradicts EPA's NSR 
Manual. (Pet'r Br. 33.) On the contrary, the Board's interpretation is based on the full 
rather than abbreviated language of the criterion. 
2. IGCC Has Not Been Successfully Demonstrated in Practice on Full-
Scale Operations 
An option is "available" only if it has "been successfully demonstrated in practice 
on full scale operations." NSR Manual at B.l 1. In contrast, an innovative technology, is 
one that is "still under development and ha[s] not been demonstrated in a commercial 
application." NSR Manual at B. 13. Based on that standard, and after receiving extensive 
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expert testimony, the Board made a finding of fact that "IGCC is not an 'available' 
technology, but is still in the developmental stage." (SPC 4700.)29 
Sierra Club asserted that various "gasification" plants, including the Italian plants, 
currently being operated worldwide, are analogous to the coal feedstock IGCC plants. 
(Pet'r Br. 34.) The Board heard and rejected this factual assertion because liquid 
feedstock "gasification" plants are not analogous to coal feedstock IGCC plants due to 
the differing designs and operational availabilities (SPC 4700 (based in part on Stephen 
Jenkins expert testimony, 3520, 3522, 3526-27).) Sierra Club also asserted that the four 
coal feedstock IGCC plants that have been operational were relevant. (Pet'r Br. 34.) 
However, the Board heard and rejected this factual assertion as well because those were 
all "demonstration" sized rather than full scale operation size, and even so were not 
operationally successful (low operational availability). (SPC 4700 (based in part on 
Stephen Jenkins expert testimony, SPC 3526-27).)30 
3. IGCC Is Not Even Commercially Offered at the 270 MW Size 
Sierra Club argues that evidence of "availability" under Step 1 is "demonstrated 
by the IGCC technology currently on the open market." (Pet'r Br. 35.) However, the 
The Board relied on expert testimony that IGCC has only been demonstrated at 
small scale (SPC 3526-27, 4868-75), and even then, not successfully, given its low 
operational availability (SPC 3527, 3547, 3518-25), and other performance problems 
(SPC 3526, 3547). It will be another six to seven years before it will be possible to 
determine whether IGCC has been successfully demonstrated. (SPC 3526, 3547.) 
30
 Sierra Club also alleges that as many as "thirteen additional IGCC electric 
plants have been announced domestically." (Pet'r Br. 35.) To say that an IGCC plant 
has been "announced" is not the same as to present credible evidence that it has actually 
"been successfully demonstrated in practice on full scale operations." 
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NSR Manual provides that whether a technology "can be obtained by the applicant 
through commercial channels" is relevant under Step 2 of the BACT analysis rather than 
Step 1 that is at issue here. NSR Manual at B. 17. In any event, the Board heard expert 
testimony that the "250-280 MW net demonstration size plant is not being commercially 
offered." (SPC 3536.) To the extent Sierra Club presented competing contrary testimony 
as suggested in its brief, the Board rejected that testimony in making its finding of fact 
that IGCC was "not an 'available' technology." (SPC 4700.)31 
D. Sierra Club Has Not Been Substantially Prejudiced 
The Court may grant relief "only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4). Sierra Club has not articulated any specific manner in which 
it has been prejudiced. 
Sierra Club asserts that the outcome it sought in this proceeding "is the inclusion 
of IGCC in the BACT process." (Pet'r Br. 35.) Nevertheless, in an effort to infer some 
potential prejudice, Sierra Club suggests that "had IGCC been included" in Step 1, "a 
reasonable likelihood exists" that IGCC would have emerged through Steps 2-5 as the 
technology of choice. (Pet'r Br. 36.) Whether IGCC would have emerged through 
Steps 2-5 was not an issue Sierra Club asserted in its Request for Agency Action, was not 
31
 The 250-280 MW size IGCC plants referenced by Sierra Club were for 
demonstration purposes only, and are not commercially practical, efficient or cost-
effective. (SPC 3536.) The only size that is currently being offered by IGCC providers 
is the 630 MW reference plant size. (SPC 3536.) Because Step 1 only requires the 
inclusion of technologies with "a practical potential for application to the emissions 
uni t . . . under evaluation," see NSR Manual at B.5, IGCC is not an available technology. 
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an issue determined by the Board, was not raised in this appeal by Sierra Club, and is not 
otherwise before this Court. In any event, there was no testimony (expert or otherwise) 
to that effect presented to the Board, and this inferential reference that IGCC would have 
emerged and been used by SPC should be ignored. In fact, the only opinion rendered on 
that subject and presented to the Board was that of respondents' expert Stephen Jenkins 
who testified that even if IGCC were required to be included in Step 1, CFB would still 
be selected over IGCC as BACT under Steps 2-5. (SPC 3545-46.) 
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR—Because the Board Did Not Err in Its Formal 
Adjudication and Sierra Club Received a Full and Fair Opportunity to Be 
Heard, the Cumulative Error Doctrine Does Not Apply 
The Board did not err when it reviewed DAQ's issuance of the AO, and certainly 
did not err several times over so as to be prejudicial. Even if had erred in some respect 
(although it did not), such errors were not so widespread or repeated as to undermine the 
Court's confidence that a fair trial was had. Under the cumulative error doctrine, a 
reviewing court will reverse "only if the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." Radman v. Flanders Corp., 
2007 UT App 351, f^ 20, 172 P.3d 668. The narrow circumstances warranting the 
application of the doctrine is where several actions are found to be errors, and moreover, 
to be prejudicial errors. Id. at f^ 28 (holding that "the cumulative error doctrine is 
inapplicable in this case because the [plaintiffs] have failed to show that the complained 
of actions were even errors"); State ex relAMD., 2006 UT App 457,128, 153 P.3d 724 
("If the claims are found on appeal to not constitute error, or the errors are found to be so 
minor as to result in no harm, the doctrine will not be applied."). 
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Further, the rationale behind the cumulative error doctrine of ensuring a fair 
hearing is not triggered here. The "hallmarks of due process" are plainly met here 
because Sierra Club had ample notice and opportunity to be heard. Utah County v. Ivie, 
2006 UT 33, f 22, 137 P.3d 797 ("The hallmarks of due process are notice and an 
opportunity to be heard, but not all proceedings demand the same level of process."). 
Sierra Club submitted extensive comments, and received an opportunity to intervene and 
have the Board review DAQ's issuance of the AO (including the submittal of extensive 
briefs, expert reports, live presentation of factual and expert witnesses, and lengthy legal 
argument). After four years of litigation, including numerous dispositive motions and 
extensive evidentiary hearings, Sierra Club had ample notice and opportunity to be heard. 
CONCLUSION 
Sierra Club has failed to demonstrate that the law required DAQ to consider 
carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gas emissions, or include IGCC, in its BACT 
analysis. Even if the Board were to conclude that, as a matter of public policy, carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions should be considered, or that IGCC should 
included, in future BACT analyses, any such new policy should be implemented through 
general rulemaking rather than through case-specific litigation. For the foregoing 
reasons, Sierra Club's request for a remand should be denied. 
Dated this 3d day of July, 2008. 
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ADDENDA 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990) (federal statutory definition of BACT) 
B. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(12) (federal regulatory definition of BACT) 
C. Utah Admin. Code r. 307-101-2 (2005) (Original BACT Regulation)(same from 
98-06) 
D. Utah Admin. Code r. 307-401-2 (2006) (Subsequently Revised BACT Regulation) 
E. Board's 1/9/08 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Order (Final 
Order). 
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Tab A 
42 U.S.C. § 7479 (1990) Definitions 
(3) The term "best available control technology'5 means an emission limitation based on 
the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the 
permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, 
and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, 
including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion 
techniques for control of each such pollutant. In no event shall application of "best 
available control technology" result in emissions of any pollutants which will exceed the 
emissions allowed by any applicable standard established pursuant to section 7411 or 
7412 of this title. Emissions from any source utilizing clean fuels, or any other means, to 
comply with this paragraph shall not be allowed to increase above levels that would have 
been required under this paragraph as it existed prior to November 15, 1990. 
TabB 
40 C.F.R. 52.21(b)(12) BACT 
(12) Best available control technology means an emissions limitation (including a visible 
emission standard) based on the maximum degree of reduction for each pollutant subject 
to regulation under Act which would be emitted from any proposed major stationary 
source or major modification which the Administrator, on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is 
achievable for such source or modification through application of production processes or 
available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or 
innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of such pollutant. In no event shall 
application of best available control technology result in emissions of any pollutant which 
would exceed the emissions allowed by any applicable standard under 40 CFR Parts 60 
and 61. If the Administrator determines that technological or economic limitations on the 
application of measurement methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the 
imposition of an emissions standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, 
operational standard, or combination thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the 
requirement for the application of best available control technology. Such standard shall, 
to the degree possible, set forth the emissions reduction achievable by implementation of 
such design, equipment, work practice or operation, and shall provide for compliance by 
means which achieve equivalent results. 
TabC 
UAC R307-101-2 (2005) Former BACT Definition 
"Best Available Control Technology (BACT)" means an emission limitation and/or other 
controls to include design, equipment, work practice, operation standard or combination 
thereof, based on the maximum degree or reduction of each pollutant subject to 
regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act emitted from or 
which results from any emitting installation, which the Air Quality Board, on a case-by-
case basis taking into account energy, environmental and economic impacts and other 
costs, determines is achievable for such installation through application of production 
processes and available methods, systems and techniques, including fuel cleaning or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of each such pollutant. In 
no event shall applications of BACT result in emissions of any pollutants which will 
exceed the emissions allowed by Section 111 or 112 of the Clean Air Act. 
TabD 
UAC R307-401-2 (2006 and current) Current BACT Definition 
"Best available control technology" means an emissions limitation (including a visible 
emissions standard) based on the maximum degree of reduction for each air contaminant 
which would be emitted from any proposed stationary source or modification which the 
executive secretary, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, 
and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such source or 
modification through application of production processes or available methods, systems, 
and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion 
techniques for control of such pollutant. In no event shall application of best available 
control technology result in emissions of any pollutant which would exceed the emissions 
allowed by any applicable standard under 40 CFR parts 60 and 61. If the executive 
secretary determines that technological or economic limitations on the application of 
measurement methodology to a particular emissions unit would make the imposition of 
an emissions standard infeasible, a design, equipment, work practice, operational 
standard or combination thereof, may be prescribed instead to satisfy the requirement for 
the application of best available control technology. Such standard shall, to the degree 
possible, set forth the emissions reduction achievable by implementation of such design, 
equipment, work practice or operation, and shall provide for compliance by means which 
achieve equivalent results. 
TabE 
BEFORE THE 
UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD 
In the Matter of: * 
* Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Sevier Power Company Power Plant and Final Order 
Sevier County, Utah * 
DAQE-AN2529001-04 
The Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club (referred to herein as "Sierra Club") filed a Request 
for Agency Action dated November 12, 2004 and petition to intervene seeking review of the 
October 12, 2004 decision by the Executive Secretary of the Utah Air Quality Board to issue an 
Approval Order granting a permit to Sevier Power Company ("SPC") to construct and operate a 
coal-fired power plant in Sevier County, Utah. The Sierra Club presented nine issues for 
consideration of the Board. The Utah Air Quality Board denied Sierra Club's petition to 
intervene, which was appealed. The Utah Supreme Court, on November 21, 2006, determined 
Sierra Club had made a sufficient demonstration to support intervention and remanded the matter 
to the Board for hearing. PacifiCorp had also filed a petition to intervene, which was initially 
denied, but as a result of the Utah Supreme Court decision, PacifiCorp renewed its petition to 
intervene. The Board granted PacifiCorp intervention on Issue 2 of the Sierra Club's Request for 
Agency Action. Sierra Club filed a Motion for Leave to Amend its Request for Agency Action 
that was granted by the Board, which added an Issue 10. 
On April 4, 2007, the Utah Air Quality Board heard dispositive motions from all parties 
on Sierra Club's Requests for Agency Action. Joro Walker and David Becker appeared for the 
Sierra Club; Brian W. Burnett and Fred W. Finlinson appeared for SPC; Martin K. Banks 
1 
appeared for PacifiCorp; and Paul M. McConkie and Christian C. Stephens appeared for the 
Executive Secretary. Utah Air Quality Board members present were Dianne R. Nielson, Wayne 
M. Samuelson, H. Craig Petersen, James R. Horrocks, Nan Bunker, Stead Burwell, Stephen C. 
Sands, Don J. Sorensen, Kathy Van Dame, and Darrell Smith. Mr. Sands and Ms. Van Dame 
recused themselves. Mr. Ernest E. Wessman had earlier recused himself and left the 
proceedings. The Board denied all motions with the exception of the Motions for Judgment on 
the Pleadings by SPC, PacifiCorp, and the Executive Secretary on Issue 1, which was granted. 
Sierra Club subsequently withdrew issues 5 and 6, leaving issues 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 to 
be heard by the Board at hearings on October 1,2007, October 3,2007, November 7, 2007, and 
November 12, 2007. The Board heard this matter pursuant to its authority as set forth in Chapter 
2 of Title 19 of the Utah Code and conducted the proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Utah 
Administrative Code ("UAC") R307-103 et seq. as a formal adjudicative proceeding under the 
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8. Joro 
Walker and David Becker appeared for the Sierra Club, Brian W. Burnett and Fred W. Finlinson 
appeared for SPC, and Paul M. McConkie and Christian C. Stephens appeared for the Executive 
Secretary. Issue 2 was heard on November 12, 2007, and in addition to the counsel listed above, 
Martin K. Banks and Michael Jenkins appeared for PacifiCorp. At those hearings, Utah Air 
Quality Board members present were Wayne M. Samuelson, H. Craig Petersen, James R. 
Horrocks, Nan Bunker, Kathy Van Dame (who recused herself), Joel E. Elstein, Richard W. 
Sprott (who recused himself) and Darrell Smith. Board member Stead Burwell was also in 
attendance for all but the October 1,2007, hearing. He reviewed the transcript and evidence 
from that hearing date. Mr. Ernest Wessman and Mr. Stephen C. Sands had previously recused 
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themselves and were not present. 
In all the proceedings and hearings, Fred Nelson acted as counsel for the Board. 
The underlying issue before the Board is whether the Executive Secretary complied with 
State statutes and the Utah Air Quality Board rules in issuing the October 14, 2004, Approval 
Order to Sevier Power Company. To prevail, petitioners have the burden of proving that the 
Executive Secretary failed to comply with State air quality requirements. "[T]he proper standard 
of proof in the administrative context is generally the preponderance of the evidence' standard." 
Harken SW. Corp. v. B d. of Oil Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1182 (Utah 1996). 
The Board makes the following findings, conclusions, and final order with respect to 
each of the issues presented by Sierra Club: 
Issue 1 
Issue 1 is whether the Executive Secretary failed to address carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases relating to the SPC Plant. The Board granted the Motions for Judgment on the 
Pleadings by SPC, PacifiCorp, and the Executive Secretary on this Issue 1 by a vote of seven in 
favor (Nielsen, Peterson, Burwell, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Sorenson) and none opposed 
based on the following findings and conclusions that are restated as part of this final order. 
While the United States Supreme Court has recently determined that carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases come within the definition of "air pollutant" subject to regulation under 
the federal Clean Air Act (Massachusetts v EPA, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (April 2, 2007)), neither the 
EPA (as recognized in the U.S. Supreme Court opinion) nor the Utah Air Quality Board have, to 
date, adopted rules requiring limitations or consideration of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse 
gases as part of a new source review or a BACT determination. The definition of "air pollution" 
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as defined in U.C.A. § 19-2-102(3) over which the Board has authority to control and regulate 
(U.C.A. § 19-2-104) is "the presence in the ambient air of one or more air contaminants in the 
quantities and duration and under conditions and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious to 
human health or welfare . . . as determined by the rules adopted by the board." Inasmuch as the 
Board has never adopted rules governing carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, it has not, as 
a matter of law, required limitations or consideration of carbon dioxide or other greenhouse 
gases as part of the approval order or permit process. 
The Board rejected Sierra Club's argument that the definition of BACT requires 
consideration of all pollutants that could be regulated, to include carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases. The Board interprets the language of its rule to mean that the phrase 
"pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah Air Conservation Act" -
in the definition of BACT (UAC R3 07-101-2) references pollutants for which the Board has 
established rules, not pollutants that could potentially be subject to rules. Since the Board has 
not promulgated rules governing carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases, the Executive 
Secretary had no rules to enforce, and, with respect to the issue of not requiring limitations and 
consideration of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, the Executive Secretary correctly, 
as a matter of law, issued the Approval Order to SPC without addressing carbon dioxide or other 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Issue 2 
Issue 2 is whether the Executive Secretary failed to consider adequately Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle ("IGCC") in its Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") 
determination for the SPC facility. 
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On November 12, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 
2 by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one 
opposed (Burwell) based on the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. A party intending to construct a "major" new source in a NAAQS attainment area 
must first obtain an approval order. UAC R307-401-1 (references to the Board's rules in the 
findings and conclusions of this order are the rules in effect at the time of the issuance of the 
Approval Order to SPC). 
2. The applicant for an approval order must demonstrate that the new source will employ 
BACT for each criteria pollutant emitted. UAC R307-401-6. 
3. UAC R307-101-2(4) defines BACT as follows: 
[A]n emission limitation and/or other controls to include design, equipment, work 
practice, operation standard or combination thereof, based on the maximum degree or 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under the Clean Air Act and/or the Utah 
Air Conservation Act emitted from or which results from any emitting installation, which 
the Air Quality Board, on a case-by-case basis taking into account energy, environmental, 
and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable for such installation 
through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and 
techniques, including fuel cleaning or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques 
for control of each such pollutant. . . . 
4. SPC filed an application, a Notice of Intent ("NOF'), asking the Executive Secretary 
for an approval order to allow SPC to build a power plant utilizing a Circulating Fluidized Bed 
("CFB") boiler in conjunction with a limestone injection and a dry lime scrubber for sulfur 
dioxide control, along with selective non-catalytic reduction ("SNCR") with ammonia injection 
as a post-combustion control device for NOx control. SPC 0052-0738. 
5. After an applicant has proposed the type of installation or power generation 
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technology, then through the BACT analysis the applicant must identify available emission 
control technology options for the particular installation proposed. Campbell Pre-Filed 
Testimony, August 31,2007 at 5. Campbell Hearing Testimony, November 12,2007 at 265-
273,290. 
6. In doing a BACT review, a "top-down" method, though not required, may be used for 
determining BACT as follows: (1) identify control technology options ("Step 1"), (2) eliminate 
technically infeasible control technologies, (3) rank remaining technologies, (4) evaluate the 
most effective controls, and (5) select the most effective remaining option. EPA's Draft New 
Source Review Workshop Manual ("Draft NSR Manual"), at B.5. 
7. In review of the SPC application for an approval order, the Executive Secretary 
determined that IGCC had not been proposed by SPC and that IGCC was a different power 
generation technology and not a "control technology" to be considered under Step 1, and 
therefore, did not include IGCC in assessing what was BACT for the proposed facility. 
September 27, 2004 Memorandum to Sevier Power Plant File, at 30, SPC 2523. Jenks Pre-Filed 
Testimony, October 22, 2007, at 9-10. Jenks Hearing Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 37. 
8. Sierra Club argued that IGCC is a production process and existing available 
technology that should have been considered in any BACT determination for the SPC plant, and 
presented information on plants in the United States and Europe. Thompson Pre-Filed 
Testimony, August 31, 2007, at 5-41. Thompson Pre-Filed Testimony, November 6, 2007, at 2-
9. Thompson Hearing Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 99-142. 
9. In a CFB plant, coal is a fuel, whereas in an IGCC plant the coal is a feedstock for a 
chemical process, where it is thermally converted into a gas. For an IGCC facility, this syngas 
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which is the fUel is then combusted in a separate gas turbine power plant, not a boiler. Jenkins 
Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007 at 3-5, 7, 9-10. Jenkins Hearing Testimony, November 
12,2007 at 182-184, 208-209. 
10. IGCC is a power generation technology, not an emission control technology. Jenkins 
Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007 at 4, 7, 8, 42. Campbell Hearing Testimony, November 
12,2007. at 281, 288. Jenkins Hearing Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 187-190, 200, 208. 
11. IGCC is not a technology that can be added onto or designed into the proposed CFB 
installation "for the control of . . . pollutant[s]." Jenkins Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007, 
at 7. Jenkins Hearing Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 188-190. 
12. The BACT requirement is not to be used "as a means to redefine the design of the 
source when considering available emission control options." Draft NSR Manual at B.13. In re 
Pennsauken County, New Jersey Resource Recovery Facility, PSD Appeal No. 88-8, 1988 WL 
249035 (EPA November 10, 1988). EPA's 8/30/07 Response to Comment #2a, Deseret Power's 
Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00, attached to Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, October 22,2007. 
13. Because of the fundamental differences between CFB and IGCC, requiring the 
inclusion of IGCC would effectively require SPC to redefine the design of its proposed CFB 
installation. Jenkins Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007, at 9-10, 42. Jenkins Hearing 
Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 189 -190. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007, 
at 4, 8, 10-11. 
14. Of the numerous states that have considered the issue of whether to include IGCC in 
a BACT analysis for a proposed CFB boiler, only three (Illinois, New Mexico, and Montana) did 
so, and Montana has since determined that IGCC not be included because it would redefine the 
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source. None of those states went on to conclude that IGCC was BACT. Campbell Pre-Filed 
Testimony, August 31,2007, at 10-11. SPC's Summary of State Determinations re Inclusion of 
IGCC in BACT, attached to SPC's Pre-Hearing Brief. 
15. Even if IGCC should otherwise be considered in a BACT analysis, only "available" 
control options are required to be included in Step 1. UAC R307-101-2(4); Draft NSR Manual 
B.5,B.ll . 
16. With respect to the SPC installation, IGCC is not an "available" technology, but is 
still in the developmental stage. Jenkins Pre-Filed Testimony, August 31, 2007, at 4, 16, 20-21, 
24, 28, 30-31, 40-42. Jenkins Hearing Testimony, November 12, 2007, at 200-204, 209-210, 
240-241, 307-308. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Under the BACT definition in UAC R307-101-2(4), IGCC does not need to be 
included in a BACT analysis, in that it is an installation that is a different power production 
technology and to do so would require redefining the source. Findings of Fact 9-13. 
2. Because the law does not require the inclusion of IGCC in the BACT analysis, the 
Executive Secretary did not err by not requiring the inclusion of IGCC. 
3. In exercising any discretion the Executive Secretary had to require or not require the 
inclusion of IGCC in Step 1 of the BACT analysis, the Executive Secretary's decision to not 
require the inclusion of IGCC was reasonable. 
4. Even if the Executive Secretary was otherwise required to include IGCC in the BACT 
analysis, the Executive Secretary did not err by not requiring consideration of IGCC in the 
BACT analysis because only "available" control options are required to be included in Step 1, 
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and, with respect to the SPC application, IGCC could not be considered an "available" 
technology. Findings of Fact 16. 
Issue 3 
Issue 3 is whether the Executive Secretary failed to provide adequate justification for not 
requiring Sevier Power Company to meet the most stringent oxides of nitrogen ("NOx") BACT 
limits proposed or required for other CFB Boilers. 
On November 7, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 
3 by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one 
opposed (Burwell) based on the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. SPC's NOI to build a power plant utilized a CFB boiler with selective non-catalytic 
reduction ("SNCR") with ammonia injection as a post-combustion control device for NOx 
control. SPC 0054-0738. 
2. SPC is required to employ the "best available control technology" ("BACT") for NOx. 
UACR307-401-6(1). 
3. SPC submitted a BACT analysis for NOx with its NOI. SPC 0139-0145. 
4. SPC's BACT analysis concluded that the proposed emission limit for NOx (0.10 
lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour basis) was equivalent to or lower than other facilities using CFB 
boilers with SNCR, SPC 0139-0145. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-13. 
Conger Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 114-122. 
5. The Executive Secretary conducted a BACT analysis and independently evaluated 
control technologies with potential application to SPC's proposed CFB boiler. SPC 1031-1035. 
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Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 8-9. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 
2007, at 161-180. 
6. The Executive Secretary identified two technologies that were potentially applicable 
to the SPC project: SNCR which had been employed by SPC and Selective Catalytic Reduction 
("SCR")- SPC 1031. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 8. 
7. Sierra Club argued that SCR should have been more fully considered in the BACT 
determination for the SPC facility in that: SCR's use had been demonstrated in CFB facilities 
overseas, SCR has better NOx control efficiencies, the Utah Division of Air Quality ("DAQ") 
did not discuss SCR with vendors, and DAQ did not describe why SCR technology transfer to 
CFBs was infeasible. Sahu Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 5-22. Sahu Hearing 
Testimony, October 3,2007, at 621-655, 682-690. 
8. The use of SCR on coal-fired atmospheric CFB boilers is not demonstrated as 
technically feasible because of issues involving the high particulate matter of the exhaust stream, 
the low exhaust gas temperature, as well as the chemical composition of the exhaust stream. 
SPC 1032. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 8-9. Jenks Hearing Testimony, 
October 1, 2007, at 161-180,211. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 11-16. 
Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 667, 676-677. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, 
June 27,2007, at 11-13. Conger Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 120. Hennenfent Pre-
Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-7. Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 
309-314. 
9. The Executive Secretary <cwas unable to find a single instance of an atmospheric coal-
fired atmospheric CFB boiler using SCR for control of NOx." Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
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September 10, 2007, at 8. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20,2007, at 12-16. 
10. The CFB boilers located overseas that use SCR are not comparable as argued by 
Sierra Club because they are small industrial boilers which do not bum coal. Jenks Hearing 
Testimony, October 1,2007, at 177-180. Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 
312-314. 
11. The Executive Secretary approved SPC's selection of SNCR as BACT for the SPC 
project because SNCR has been demonstrated to offer the maximum degree of reduction in 
reducing NOx emissions from CFB boilers. SPC 1032-1033. 
12. SNCR technology has been demonstrated for use on atmospheric coal-fired CFB 
boilers and is BACT for the SPC project. SPC 0139-0145, 1031-1035. Jenks Pre-Filed 
Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 8-9. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 161-180. 
Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 17-20. Campbell Hearing Testimony, 
October 3, 2007, at 664-665, 692-693. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-13. 
Conger Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 114-122, 149-150. Hennenfent Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-7. 
13. Sierra Club argued that even using SNCR, the Executive Secretary had not 
appropriately established NOx emission limitations for the SPC facility, more stringent numbers 
should have been applied based on actual emissions data from other facilities and alternative 
averaging periods. Sahu Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007. Sahu Hearing Testimony, October 
3,2007, at 621-655, 682-690. 
14. The Executive Secretary reviewed EPA's BACT/RACT/LAER Clearinghouse, along 
with web searches and a review of other sources using CFB boilers with SNCR to approve the 
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emission rate for NOx of 0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour basis as BACT for SPC's project, 
SPC 1033-1035. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 8-9. Jenks Hearing 
Testimony, October 1,2007, at 161-180, 218-220. 
15. Permits with different time frames are statistically comparable to SPC's proposed 
emission limit of 0.10 lb/MMBtu on a 24-hour basis. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 
2007, at 8. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 191-195. Campbell Hearing 
Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 655-658. 
16. The Executive Secretary did not find "any atmospheric CFB boiler with a lower 
emission limit expressed with the same averaging period." Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10, 2007, at 9. 
17. Other facilities, including those listed in the National Parks Service comments, are 
distinguished from the SPC emission limits based on the type of technology, fuel used, size of 
facility, different permit emission time periods and, actual emissions versus permit emission 
limits. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 161-180. Campbell Hearing Testimony, 
October 3,2007, at 655-675. 
18. The emissions limit for NOx for the SPC project, 0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour 
basis, is the lowest permit limit for NOx for an atmospheric CFB boiler using SNCR and is 
BACT for the SPC project. SPC 0139-0145, 1031-1035; Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 
10, 2007, at 8-9. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 161-180. Campbell Pre-Filed 
Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 17-20. Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 660-
666,691-694. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-13. Conger Hearing Testimony, 
October 1, 2007, at 114-122. Hennenfent Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-7. 
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Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 323. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Executive Secretary correctly determined that SNCR technology is BACT for the 
SPC project. Findings of Fact 4-12. 
2. The Executive Secretary did not err and complied with state rules in establishing the 
emission limit for NOx (0.10 lb/MMBtu based on a 24-hour basis) as BACT in that it is 
equivalent to or lower than other facilities using CFB boilers with SNCR. Findings of Fact 14-
18. 
3. Sierra Club did not meet its burden of proving SCR was feasible and available to be 
considered as BACT, nor that a more stringent emission limitation was BACT. 
Issue 4 
Issue 4 is whether the Executive Secretary failed to consider sufficiently activated carbon 
injection for control of mercury emissions from the SPC facility in its MACT determination. 
On November 7, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 
4 by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker,and Elstein) and one 
opposed (Burwell) based on the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The SPC facility will emit mercury, a Hazardous Air Pollutant ("HAP"), as defined by 
112(b) of the Clean Air Act. UAC R307-101-2. 
2. SPC was required to obtain an approved Maximum Achievable Control Technology 
("MACT") determination from the Executive Secretary regarding its mercury emissions pursuant 
to 40 C.F.R. § 63.43 which was incorporated into Utah's regulations at UAC R307-214-2(2). 
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3. 40 C.F.R. § 63.43 (d) (1) and (2) state as follows: 
The MACT emission limitation or MACT requirements recommended by the 
applicant and approved by the permitting authority shall not be less stringent than 
the emission control which is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar 
source, as determined by the permitting authority. 
Based upon available information, as defined in this subpart, the MACT emission 
limitation and control technology (including any requirements under paragraph 
(d)(3) of this section) recommended by the applicant and approved by the 
permitting authority shall achieve the maximum degree of reduction in emissions 
of HAP which can be achieved by utilizing those control technologies that can be 
identified from the available information, taking into consideration the costs of 
achieving such emission reduction and any non-air quality health and 
environmental impacts and energy requirements associated with the emission 
reduction. 
4. SPC conducted a case by case MACT determination which was submitted to 
the Executive Secretary on December 5,2003. SPC 0007-0011. 
5. The SPC MACT determination included review and comparison of existing sources of 
mercury emissions from CFB boilers with fabric filters, and evaluation of other control options. 
Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 17-18. 
6. CFB boilers typically have high flue gas concentrations of high-carbon-content fly ash 
and therefore high levels of mercury capture can be accomplished in particulate emission control 
devices such as a baghouse (fabric filters). Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 16-
19. Conger Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 534. Hennenfent Pre-Filed Testimony, June 
27,2007, at 9-10. Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 548-550, 556. 
7. Sierra Club argued that activated carbon injection should have been more fully 
considered and applied for control of mercury and that actual mercury emissions at other coal-
fired power plants are lower than SPC's emission limits. Sahu Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 
2007, at 23-32. Sahu Pre-Filed Rebuttal Testimony, September 19,2007, at 1-4. Sahu 
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Testimony, October 3,2007, at 577-585. 
8. Activated carbon injection had not been demonstrated to achieve better results than 
that proposed by SPC and it had not been demonstrated as available technology for the type of 
facility proposed by SPC. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 18-19. Conger 
Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 534. Hennenfent Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 
9-10. Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 548-550,556. Jenks Pre-Filed 
Testimony, September 10,2007, at 10-11. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 564-
566, 568, 571. Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 599-605. 
9. The use by SPC of a sorbent injection system with a dry-lime scrubber for control of 
NOx and other acid gases that will inject low-moisture slurry of lime into the exhaust prior to the 
baghouse would result in the lime particles absorbing sulfur compounds and acid gases as well as 
mercury emissions that are collected in the bag house, similar to an activated carbon injection 
system. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 10-11. 
10. The MACT emission limit for mercury for SPC is 4 x 10'7 lb/MMBtu or four tenths 
of a pound per trillion Btu heat input. SPC 0861-0864,2481-2493. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10, 2007, at 10-12. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 27, 37-38. 
11. The SPC mercury limitation is the lowest mercury emission limit of any coal-fired 
electricity utility boiler. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 10. Jenks Hearing 
Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 567. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20,2007, at 29. 
Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 607. Hennenfent Hearing Testimony, October 
3,2007, at 563. 
12. EPA has rescinded the MACT standard for mercury and is regulating mercury 
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emissions from power plants under the New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS"). Conger 
Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 14-15. 70 FR 15994 (March 29,2005). 
13. EPA's current NSPS requirements for coal-fired electric generating units for mercury 
include the use of fabric filters or electrostatic precipitators, wet or dry flue gas desulftirization, 
SCR or SNCR on bituminous units. 70 FR 28606 (May 18, 2005). Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, 
June 27,2007 at 20. 
14. SPC's permit application proposes to use bituminous coal, fabric filters, SNCR for 
NOx reduction and a dry lime scrubber which meet the technical basis that EPA used to 
determine Best Demonstrated Technology under NSPS. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 
2007, at 20. 
15. EPA's NSPS standard for bituminous coal is 20 x 10"6 lb/MWh. Conger Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 15. 
16. SPC's emissions limit for mercury in its AO is below the NSPS mercury control 
limit. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 20. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Executive Secretary properly determined that SPC's emissions limit for mercury 
complied with the MACT requirements in 40 CFR § 63.43(d) and was and is the lowest in the 
United States. Findings of Fact 6, 9, and 11. 
2. The Executive Secretary did not err in rejecting activated carbon injection for the 
reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact 8 and 9 above. 
3. The Executive Secretary correctly determined that the MACT emission limit for 
mercury for SPC is 4 x 10"7 Ib/MMBtu. 
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4. Sierra Club failed to meet its burden of proof that activated carbon injection was 
commercially available and could be applied to the SPC facility. 
Issue 7 
Issue 7 is whether the Executive Secretary failed to require sufficient analysis of the 
impacts of the SPC facility on visibility, soils, and vegetation. 
Mr. Horrocks recused himself from discussion and voting on this issue. On November 7, 
2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 7 by a vote of five in 
favor (Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one opposed (Burwell) based on 
the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. UAC R307-405-6(2)(a)(i)(D) states that an NOI must contain: 
An analysis of the air quality related impact of the source or modification 
including an analysis of the impairment to visibility, soils, and vegetation 
and the projected air quality impact from general commercial, residential, 
industrial, and other growth associated with the source or modification. 
The owner or operator need not provide an analysis of the impact on 
vegetation having no significant commercial or recreational value. 
2. SPC submitted in its NOI an analysis of the impacts to visibility, soils and vegetation. 
SPC 0269-0272, 0637-0682, and 0284-0287. 
3. Sierra Club argued that the analysis was inadequate because of lack of visibility 
information for Sevier Valley, lack of analysis of pollutants other than S02 and inadequate 
growth projections and information. Sahu Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 33-38. Sahu 
Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 496-502. 
4. SPC conducted and submitted, and the Executive Secretary reviewed and approved, an 
analysis regarding visibility by submitting a plume blight or visual impact analysis to determine 
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whether or not a plume emanating from the proposed SPC project would be visible inside the 
nearby national parks (Class I areas) that require special protection. The results of SPC's plume 
blight analysis showed that at five areas in Utah (Arches, Bryce, Canyonlands, Capitol Reef, and 
Zion National Parks) and one Class I area in Colorado (Weminuche Wilderness Area), the plume 
would not be visible to an observer in these Class I areas. Capital Reef is the closest 
(approximately 50 Kilometers) to Sevier Valley. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 
22-25. Conger Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 427-429. Orth Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 12, 2007, at 13. Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 516, 520,528-
530. 
5. The visibility impacts in the Sevier Valley (a Class II area) were not modeled since 
there is no regulatory (federal or state) requirement for analyses of visibility impact in Class II 
areas. The Executive Secretary determined that "(n)ear-field modeling for visibility is also 
problematic because the models are complex and the results are too unreliable for using in pre-
construction permitting. There are also limitations to their applicable use in transport areas as 
small as the Sevier Valley." Orth Pre-Filed Testimony, September 12,2007, at 11-12. Orth 
Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 443,452-453. Conger Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 
2007, at 22-25. Conger Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 427-429,443. Campbell Pre-
Filed Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 24-26. 
6. SPC's plume blight or visual impact analysis for Class I areas served as a proxy for 
Class II areas because there were Class I areas that were close enough to be covered by a plume 
blight analysis rather than a regional haze analysis. Campbell Hearing Testimony, October 3, 
2007, at 528-530. 
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7. SPC's AO contains two provisions for opacity monitoring, one relating to the overall 
facility and another specific monitoring requirement for opacity at SPC's stack which govern and 
are related to visibility close to SPC's facility. SPC 2490. 
8. In preparing the soils and vegetation section of a PSD permit, SPC consulted 
EPA's Draft NSR Manual and the Natural Resource Conservation Service ("NRCS") in 
order to review the soil types in the area. Draft NSR Manual at D.4-5. Richins Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 4-7. 
9. SPC concluded that none of the soil types in the area are likely to show adverse 
impacts as a result of the low levels of near field emissions from the SPC power plant. The 
emissions from the SPC facility are mildly acidic and should be neutralized by the soils in the 
area near SPC's facility which are mildly to strongly alkaline. Richins Pre-Filed Testimony, 
June 27, 2007, at 6-7. 
10. SPC also relied on the fact that "for most types of soils and vegetation, ambient 
concentrations of criteria pollutants below the secondary [NAAQS] will not result in harmful 
effects. " Draft NSR Manual at D.4-5. Because SPC's modeled emissions are below the 
secondary NAAQS and the agricultural areas of the Sevier Valley are almost completely 
excluded from the predicted impact areas of the plume, harm to vegetation is not expected. 
Richins Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 13-15. Orth Pre-Filed Testimony, September 12, 
2007, at 10. Richins Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 455-464. Jenks Hearing 
Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 481. 
11. SPC cs review of the vegetation surrounding the SPC power plant, after consultation 
with NRCS, Bureau of Land Management and the United States Forest Service did not identify 
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species that required regulatory protection. Richins Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 8-9. 
12. SPC determined that while some primary crops grown in the Sevier Valley, alfalfa, 
wheat and barley are considered to be SO2 sensitive, the maximum modeled SO2 concentrations 
are below the threshold level at which harm to these crops is known to occur. Richins Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 12-13. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 12-13. 
13. SPC's emissions and modeling information was reviewed by DAQ's toxicologist 
who determined that additional analysis was not required. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10, 2007, at 12-13. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 3, 2007, at 481. 
14. The Executive Secretary reviewed SPC's modeling analysis and determined that no 
observable changes in native vegetation or crop plants were expected to occur. Orth Pre-Filed 
Testimony, September 12, 2007, at 10-11. 
15. The SPC growth analysis determined that the additional impacts caused by the 
project would be minimal. SPC 0288, 0742-0747, 1402-1409. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10, 2007, at 12-13. Campbell Pre-Filed Testimony, August 20, 2007, at 20-22. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. UAC R307-405-6(2)(a)(i)(D) setting forth the requirements relating to visibility, soils, 
vegetation and impacts from growth for projects such as the SPC facility does not specify the 
extent or content of the analysis regarding the impairment to visibility, soils, vegetation and 
growth for the area. 
2. The Executive Secretary's determination that the analysis submitted by SPC on 
visibility, soils, vegetation and impacts from growth was adequate and met the requirements of 
UAC R307-405-6(2)(a)(i)(D) was correct and reasonable. 
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3. The Executive Secretary did not err in determining that the requirements of UAC 
R307-405-6(2)(a)(i)(D) had been met on visibility based on the Findings of Fact 4-7 as stated 
above. 
4. While the SPC analysis focused on some specific pollutants for impact on soils and 
vegetation, all emissions were considered (Findings of Fact 8-14), and the Sierra Club did not 
meet its burden of proof that analysis of other impacts was not done or necessary. 
5. The Executive Secretary did not err in determining that the requirements of UAC 
R307-405-6(2)(a)(i)(D) had been met for growth analysis based on Finding of Fact 15 above. 
Issue 8 
Issue 8 is whether the Executive Secretary illegally exempted the proposed facility from a 
cumulative Class I increment analysis. 
On November 7, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 
8 by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one 
opposed (Burwell) based on the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. Utah Admin. Code R307-405-6(2) states: 
Every new source or major modification must be reviewed by the Executive Secretary to 
determine the air quality impact of the source to include a determination whether the 
source will cause or contribute to a violation of the maximum allowable increases or the 
NAAQS in any area. The determination of air quality impact will be made as of the 
source's projected start-up date. Such determination shall take into account all allowable 
emissions of approved sources and growth in the affected area, or not, and, to the extent 
practicable, the cumulative effect on air quality of all sources and growth in the affected 
area. 
2. PSD increments are the maximum allowable increases of particular pollutants. PSD 
Class I increments are incremental amounts of pollution above a baseline level that cannot be 
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exceeded when new sources are constructed in a protected Class I areas. UAC R307-405-5 and 
UACR307-405-17. 
3. SPC performed an increment analysis to include a Class I increment analysis for 
Capitol Reef, Canyonlands, Zion, Arches, and Bryce National Parks. Wilkerson Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 27. Prey Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 4. 
4. The SPC cumulative analysis showed that the increments both annual and short term 
to include Class I increments were not exceeded at any National Park. Wilkerson Pre-Filed 
Testimony, June 27,2007, at 27-28, 31, 34. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 
232, 346. 
5. SILs is the acronym for Significant Impact Levels, which are concentration levels 
that consist of 4 percent of the Class I increment. Wilkerson Testimony, October 1,2007, at 
230-231. Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 26. Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10,2007, at 13-14. 
6. Applying SILs as a screening method, if a source models below the SILs, then 
the analysis is deemed complete. However, if a source models in above the Class I SILs, then a 
cumulative Class I increment analysis is required. Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 
2007, at 26,28. Prey Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 5. 
7. During the initial SPC permitting process, upon DAQ's suggestion, SPC's 
modeler contacted the National Park Service (<<NPS") for guidance on performing a cumulative 
Class I analysis. Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 26. 
8. The NPS had adopted the use of Class I SILs and recommended SILs to both SPC 
and the DAQ as the method to follow for the far-field modeling effort. Wilkerson Pre-Filed 
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Testimony, June 27 , 2007, at 26. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 230,231. 
Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 13. 
9. The use o f SILs as a screening tool is accepted in Utah and among other states and is 
supported by the National Park Service and the EPA. Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, September 
10,2007, at 13. 
10. SPC performed modeling for the SPC facility, and the modeled maximum 
concentrations came in below the PSD Class I increment and PSD Class I SILs. Wilkerson Pre-
Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 27-28, 35. Prey Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 
4-5, 7. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 346. 
11. In September 2003, SPC submitted its final permit application based upon the SILs 
modeling. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 231. 
12. In April 2004, the NPS reran the SPC's cumulative analysis using SPC's modeling 
files, but also added Hunter Unit 1 and the proposed JJPP Unit 3 to its analysis, and confirmed no 
Class I increment violations. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007 at 230-233,238. 
Heying Hearing Testimony, October 3,2007, at 393-394. 
13. Sierra Club argued that use of SILs was not appropriate without going through 
rulemaking to authorize use of SILs. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. Use of SILs is an appropriate screening device for making the determination under 
UAC R307-405-6(2) as to whether a source would cause or contribute to violations of maximum 
allowable increases or whether a full cumulative Class I increment analysis is required to make 
that demonstration. 
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2. The Executive Secretary did not err in making a determination that the final 
application from SPC could be based on the SILs analysis properly exercising discretion in 
determining the information requirements to demonstrate that the provisions of UAC R307-405-
6(2) were met. 
3. The Executive Secretary complied with UAC R307-405-6(2) based not only upon use 
of the SILs, but also the cumulative analysis performed by both SPC and the National Park 
Service which confirmed that emissions from the proposed SPC source would not cause or 
contribute to any violations of the maximum allowable increases. 
4. Use of SILs is a technical tool for making the determination under UAC R307-405-
6(2) and does not require rulemaking. 
Issue 9 
Issue 9 is whether the Executive Secretary violated Utah rules because, as permitted, the 
proposed facility will contribute to Class I SO2 increment violations at Capitol Reef National 
Park. 
On November 7, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on Issue 
9 by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one 
opposed (Burwell) based on the following findings and conclusions. 
Findings of Fact 
1. The findings of fact from Issue 8 are incorporated herein. 
2. Though the Executive Secretary ultimately relied upon the SILs, for the cumulative 
Class I increment analysis that was performed by SPC, increment consuming sources within the 
domain (Utah and surrounding states) needed to be modeled. Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, 
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June 27, 2007, at 30-31. 
3. Hunter Unit 1 and IPP Unit 3 were not included in the cumulative Class I increment 
analysis done by SPC under UAC R307-405-6(2). Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 
2007, at 33,35. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 232-33. 
4. Sierra Club argued that Hunter Unit 1 and IPP Unit 3 were required to be included 
based on documents and testimony on construction dates of Hunter Unit 1 and proposed 
construction dates of IPP Unit 3. Sierra Club Pre-Hearing Brief, Exhibits 16 and 17. Milford 
Pre-filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, at 5-7, 
5. The Executive Secretary did not require that Hunter Unit 1 be included because the 
Executive Secretary deemed Hunter Unit 1 to have been permitted and commenced construction 
before the time of the baseline date of January 6, 1975 (based on documentation presented by 
Executive Secretary), and EPA agrees with that determination. Heying Hearing Testimony, 
October 1,2007, at 257-265, 276-277. 
6. IPP Unit 3 was not included because it was not an approved, permitted source at the 
time the SPC Class I increment modeling review took place. Wilkerson Pre-Filed Testimony, 
June 27,2007, at 33, 35. 
7. In a subsequent cumulative analysis performed by the National Park Service, both IPP 
Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1 were included and no Class I increment violations were shown. 
Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 232-33, 238. Heying Hearing Testimony, 
October 3,2007, at 393-394. 
8. The Executive Secretary did not require the use of maximum actual 3 and 24-hour 
emission rates, and thus SPC used average annual emissions in its Class I increment analysis. 
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Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 8. Heying Hearing Testimony, October 1 
2007, at 254-57. 
9. PSD regulations, specifically 40 C.F.R. § 51.166(b)(21) and § 51.21(b)(21), do not 
directly address how one is to determine actual emissions when modeling short-time periods, 
such as 3 and 24-hour averaging times for a cumulative Class I increment analysis. Wilkerson 
Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 32. 
10. Sierra Club argued that using annual average emissions rates underestimates 
increment consumption because it does not account for sources which may emit at higher than 
annual averages rates over the shorter time period. Milford Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27, 2007, 
at 3-12. 
11. Sierra Club's expert acknowledged the question is unsettled. Milford Hearing 
Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 302. She testified that use of annual averages was too low, and 
that all sources simultaneously emitting at their short term maximum may be too extreme which 
level would be permissible to back away from, but did not state what should be used. Milford 
Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 299, 303-305. 
12. EPA is divided on what is an acceptable approach between the two. Heying Hearing 
Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 253-57, 266. Milford Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 
299-302. 
13. EPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the State of North Dakota stating 
that use of annual averages is an acceptable method for cumulative Class I increment analysis. 
Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 8. Heying Hearing Testimony, October 1, 
2007, at 254-257. 
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14. To model using existing sources at their maximum actual 3-hour average and 24-
hour average S0 2 emission rates overestimates the impact of those facilities. Wilkerson Hearing 
Testimony, October 1,2007, at 239-42. 
15. Use of annual averages rather than maximum actual 3-hour average and 24-hour 
average more accurately reflects actual air quality. Heying Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 
2007, at 6-8. Heying Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 257,266,268-269,272-273. 
16. SPC submitted one year of meteorological data with its September 2003 permit 
application required by the rules. Wilkerson Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 242-243. 
17. Sierra Club argued that one year of meteorological data was insufficient. Milford 
Pre-Filed Testimony, June 27,2007, at 23. Milford Hearing Testimony, October 1,2007, at 294. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Executive Secretary did not err in determining that IPP Unit 3 and Hunter 1 need 
not be included in any cumulative analysis to assess violation of Class I increments in that JJPP 
Unit 3 was not permitted and Hunter 1 was included in the baseline as supported by the Findings 
of Fact 5 above. 
2. Whether IPP Unit 3 and Hunter 1 were included by SPC in its cumulative analysis is 
not significant because in the cumulative analysis performed by the National Park Service, both 
IPP Unit 3 and Hunter Unit 1 were included and the results were also under the Class I 
increment. See Finding of Fact 7 above. 
3. The one year of meteorological data submitted by SPC complied with the regulation 
in effect at the time of the permit application. 
4. UAC R307-405-4(l) allows for discretion whether to use maximum actual short term 
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average emission rates or annual average rates. 
5. The Executive Secretary's use of long term averages for modeling purposes was 
protective of the increment in that it more accurately represented actual air quality than using 
every source's maximum emission rates and was in compliance with existing rules of the Board 
based on the Findings of Fact, specifically 14 and 15 above. 
6. The Executive Secretary complied with the rules of the Board in determining sources 
to be included, required meteorological data, and use of annual average emissions of sources in 
modeling for increment determinations. 
7. The proposed SPC installation will not contribute to Class I increment violations at 
Capitol Reef National Park based on the modeling analysis. 
Issue 10 
Issue 10 is whether the Approval Order for the SPC facility is now invalid because 
construction did not commence within 18 months of the Approval Order, having therefore 
automatically expired, and that the Executive Secretary's purported approval of the extension 
was illegal. 
On October 1, 2007, the Board ruled on the first part of Issue 10 (whether the Approval 
Order is invalid because construction did not commence within 18 months, having therefore 
automatically expired), by a vote of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, 
and Elstein) and none opposed, determining the Approval Order had not automatically expired 
based upon the following. 
Findings of Fact 
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1. The Executive Secretary signed the Sevier Power Company Approval Order ("AO") 
on October 12,2004 and 18 months from that date is April 12,2006. SPC 2531. 
2. On October 12, 2004 and on April 12,2006, the applicable rule was UAC R307-401-
11 (now renumbered as UAC R307-401-18) which provides: 
Approval orders issued by the executive secretary in accordance with the 
provisions of R307-401 shall be reviewed eighteen months after the date of 
issuance to determine the status of construction, installation, modification, 
relocation or establishment. If a continuous program of construction, installation, 
modification, relocation or establishment is not proceeding, the executive 
secretary may revoke the approval order. 
3. Condition 9 of the Sevier Power Company AO states: 
[i]f construction and/or installation has not been completed within eighteen 
months from the date of this AO, the Executive Secretary shall be notified in 
writing on the status of the construction and/or installation. At that time, the 
Executive Secretary shall require documentation of the continuous construction 
and/or installation of the operation and may revoke the AO in accordance with 
R307-401-11. 
SPC 2535. 
4. On November 17, 2005, SPC requested in a letter to the Executive Secretary that the 
running of the 18 month period for construction of the power plant be held "in abeyance" 
pending resolution of the litigation. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 13. 
Sprott Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007 at 11-12. 
5. The Executive Secretary conducted a review of the status of the SPC Approval 
Order prior to April 12, 2006. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007 at 84-86. 
Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, October 22, 2007, at 10. Sprott Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10,2007 at 11-12. 
6. On June 6,2007, the Executive Secretary, at the request of the Board, sent a 
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letter to SPC in response to the November 17,2005, letter explaining the Executive 
Secretary's position on the request and that the Approval Order had not been revoked. 
June 6, 2007 Letter from Richard Sprott to Fred Finlinson. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, 
September 10, 2007, at 13. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, October 22, 2007, at 11. 
7. Sierra Club argued that a federal rule, 40 CFR 52.2 l(r), stated that "[a]pproval 
to construct shall become invalid if construction is not commenced within 18 months of 
receipt of such approval...", and therefore SPC's Approval Order is invalid. 
8. 40 C.F.R. § 52.2l(r) was not incorporated into and effective as part of UAC 
R307-405-19(l) by the Air Quality Board, until June 2006. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The operative provisions, UAC R307-401-11 and SPC AO Condition 9, grant 
the Executive Secretary discretion to decide whether, based upon his review, to revoke an 
approval order if construction has not commenced after 18 months. The Executive 
Secretary reasonably exercised discretion in not revoking the Approval Order. 
2. 40 CFR 52.21(r) was not applicable to the SPC permit on April 12, 2006, 
therefore, the Approval Order did not automatically expire. 
3. The Executive Secretary properly interpreted and complied with the 
requirements of UAC R3 07-401-11 and SPC complied with the conditions of the 
Approval Order. 
On November 12, 2007, the Board upheld the actions of the Executive Secretary on the 
remaining part of Issue 10 (the legabty of the 18 month review of the Approval Order) by a vote 
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of six in favor (Horrocks, Peterson, Samuelson, Smith, Bunker, and Elstein) and one opposed 
(Burwell). The Boards findings and conclusions on the legality of the 18 month review were 
based on the following: 
Findings of Fact 
1. The findings of fact for the first part of Issue 10 are incorporated herein. 
2. Sierra Club argued that the Executive Secretary should have conducted a BACT 
review and established a new construction date at the time of the 18-month review. 
3. After receipt of the November 17, 2005 letter from SPC, the matter was reviewed by 
DAQ staff and there was consultation between staff and management (including the Executive 
Secretary) with respect thereto. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 86-89. Jenks Pre-
Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 13. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, October 22, 2007, at 
10. Sprott Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10, 2007, at 11-12. 
4. The Executive Secretary directed that his permitting engineer conduct an informal 
review of air quality permits that had been issued subsequent to the Sevier Power Company 
Approval Order, to compare the emissions limitations between those permits and the SPC AO. 
Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, October 22, 2007, at 11. Jenks Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, 
at 88-92. 
5. After the review, the Executive Secretary found nothing to indicate that the BACT 
determinations for the SPC facility were outdated or otherwise inadequate and opted not to 
revoke the SPC Approval Order. Jenks Pre-Filed Testimony, September 10,2007, at 13. Jenks 
Hearing Testimony, October 1, 2007, at 89-92. Sprott Pre-Filed Testimony, September 22, 2007, 
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at 11-12. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The Executive Secretary complied with the requirements of UAC R307-401-11 by 
conducting an 18 month review to determine the status of the SPC facility. 
2. UAC R307-401-11 does not require a BACT review at the time of the 18-month 
review nor does it require a modification of the permit. 
3. The Executive Secretary's actions in regard to the 18 month review were in 
compliance with the requirements of UAC R307-401-11. 
FINAL ORDER 
Based on the above, the Board finds that the Executive Secretary did comply with State 
statutes and rules of this Board in issuing the Approval Order to SPC to construct and operate a 
coal-fired electric generating facility near Sigurd in Sevier County, Utah. The Sierra Club 
Request for Agency Action as amended is denied. The Approval Order issued by the Executive 
Secretary to SPC is affirmed and upheld. 
Dated this 1 day of January, 2008. 
James Horrocks, Presiding Officer 
Rah Air Quality Board 
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Notice of the Right to Apply for Reconsideration or Review 
Within 20 days after the date this final order is signed in this matter by the Utah Air 
Quality Board, any party shall have the right to apply for reconsideration with the Board, 
pursuant to Utah Code Aim. § 63-46b-13. The request for reconsideration should state the 
specific grounds upon which relief is requested and should be submitted in writing to the Board 
at 168 North 1950 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114. A copy of the request must be mailed to 
each party by the person making the request. The filing of a request for reconsideration is not a 
prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this Order. 
Notice of the Right to Petition for Judicial Review 
Judicial review of this Order may be sought in the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure by the filing of a proper 
petition within thirty days after the date of this Order. 
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